A re-examination of localization of function in the rat neocortex / by Vardiman, Donald Ross,
71-12,622
VARDIMAN, Donald Ross, 1941-
A RE-EXAMINATION OF LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTION 
IN THE RAT NEOCORTEX.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1970 
Psychology, experimental
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
0  1971
DONALD ROSS VARDIMAN 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
A RE-EXAMINATION OF LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTION 
IN THE RAT NEOCORTEX
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 




DONALD ROSS VARDIMAN 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
1970
A RE-EXAMINATION OF LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTION 




The author wishes to extend his sincere thanks to the many 
persons who made this dissertation possible. Special thanks are ex­
tended to the members of the reading committee. These members were 
Doctors Frank A. Holloway (Chairman), Harold Williams, Oscar Parsons 
and Ronald Krug, of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 
Sciences, and Doctors Alex Roberts and Ted McClure, of the Department 
of Anatomical Sciences.
Indebtedness is also expressed to Doctor Robert K, White who, 
while at Texas Technological College, introduced the writer to the 
concept of a behavioral analysis of the III maze habit. Doctor George 
Clark also contributed immeasurable advice and assistance and served as 
a contact with the work and person of Doctor Karl S. Lashley, to whom 
this work is so heavily indebted.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my wife, who has always 
given the necessary background support, and my son, who at an early age 





LIST OF TABLES .  ..........    v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. ..  ............................  vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PROBLEM......................  1
II. BASIC INVESTIGATIONS ...................................... 29
III. DISCUSSION...................................  85
IV. SUMMARY............ .............. .............. .. 108
REFERENCES ................... . . . . . .    . . . . . .  117




1. Total Door (De) and Alternation (Ae) Errors and
Percentage of Cortical Destruction (%), by
Subject, for the Three Cortical Groups . . . . . . . . .  37
2. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Door Errors
for Combined Cortical Groups of Experiment I
and 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
3. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Alternation
Errors for Combined Cortical Groups of
Experiment I and II. . . . . .   ....................  63
4. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Door Errors
in III Maze for All Groups  ........................... 67
5. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Total Door Errors
for All Groups..............   69
6. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Alternation
Errors in III Maze for All Groups. .  ..................... 70
7. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Total Alternation
Errors for All Groups.......................................72
8. Summary of Analysis of Variance of III Maze
Latencies for All Groups....................     73
9. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Total Errors on the
Door Error Maze (DEM) for All Groups....................... 75
10. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Total Latencies on
DEM for All Groups . . . . . . . . . . . .  ..............  80
11. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Day One Activity
Scores for All Groups. . . . . .  ......................... 83
12. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Day Two Activity
Scores for All Groups. . . . . . . . . .    . 83
13. Mann-Whitney U Comparisons of Day Three Activity
Scores for All Groups........................   84
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure Page
1. The Eight Cul-de-sac Maze Used by Lashley....................17
2. A Unilateral Representation of the Three
Cortical Zones Used in this Study  ..........   30
3. A Modified Version of the III Maze Having
Twelve Culs-de-sac Instead of Eight or
Six Rows Instead of Four.  ..................   . 33
4. The Mean Performance of Each of the Cortical
Groups in Terms of Door and Alternation
Errors..........     36
5. The Door Error Maze (DEM)..........   42
6. The Alternation Error Maze (AEM)...............  44
7. An Example of an AC Subject  ............... 52
8. An Example of an MC Subject  ..........   53
9. An Example of a PC Subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
10. Mean Door Errors as a Function of Site of
Cortical Damage  .........................  55
11. Mean Door Errors per Row....................   58
12. Mean Door Errors per Trial Block. .  ..............   59
13. The Groups by Trials Interaction...................  60
14. Mean Alternation Errors per Trial .  ..........  61
15. Mean Alternation Errors per R o w ..................   62
16. An Example of a SEP Lesion.  .............64
17. An Example of a DLH Lesion.  ..............   65
18. An Example of a SCN Brain  ............................. 66
19. Mean Door Errors per Group--III Maze......................... 68
20. Mean Alternation Errors per Group--III Maze . . .  ........  71
21. Mean Latency per Row...................................... . 74
vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS-"Continued
22. Mean Door Errors per Group--DEM.................  76
23. Mean Latency per Group--DEM...........................   77
24. Mean Alternation Errors per Group--AEM...............   78
25. Mean Straight. Alley Runway Extinction Latency
per Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
26. Mean Activity Score per Group for the Three
Actxvrty Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
Vll
A RE-EXAMINATION OF LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTION 
IN THE RAT NEOCORTEX
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The history of Man's attempts to understand the precise nature 
by which his central nervous system (CNS) contributes to his behavior 
has been strongly influenced by the issue of localization versus non­
localization of function (Head, 1926; Boring, 1957; Krech, 1963, Luria, 
1966). Basically the question of localization of function asks the de­
gree to which specific behaviors are controlled by specific neural 
structures. "The problem of localization is in its essence the problem 
of relation of structural and functional units in brain activities." 
(Vygotsky, 1965). Specificity of function is guardedly granted for many 
sensory and motor functions but the assignment of specific neuroanatomi- 
cal control to complex behaviors is still an area of neuropsychological 
exploration (Luria, 1970) . Thus the question of localization of func­
tion is a viable issue today and present attempts to understand complex 
behavioral processes, such as memory, either by biochemical or probabi­
listic neural models (John, 1967) point to the importance of determining 
the behavioral significance of a given CNS unit.
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The history of neurobehavioral investigations can be roughly 
divided into three and perhaps four major eras, each of which has some 
relevance to the question of localization of function and is distinguish­
able from the others on the basis of its particular accomplishments at 
either the neuroanatomical level, the behavioral level or both. Three 
of these eras were; (1) a period of neurobehavioral naivete^, (2) a 
period of advancement in both neuroanatomical and behavioral conceptuali­
zations, and (3) a period which emphasized the necessity of studying 
behavior, in all of its complexity, in an analysis of neurobehavioral 
relationships. There are indications that future advances in neurobe­
havioral theory may depend, in part, upon an increasing emphasis on the 
possibility that complex behavioral states are the only unique proper­
ties of highly evolved neural systems--as opposed to such commonly 
ascribed properties as "mind", "consciousness", etc. (Sperry, 1964).
This would constitute a fourth period of neurobehavioral investigations 
and theorizing. While having an element of chronological order in their 
occurrence, these periods are primarily defined in terms of men, their 
theories and their methods of investigating neurobehavioral relation­
ships.
The following sections will deal briefly with the first three 
eras of neurobehavioral inquiry, including present doctrines concerning 
the localization of complex behaviors in the CNS. A more detailed con­
sideration of a possible fourth era of neurobehavioral conceptualization 
will be reserved for the section of Chapter III which deals with the 
more general considerations of the neurobehavioral analysis employed in 
this presentation.
The Age of Neurobehavioral Naivete^
This era begins, of course, in Man's pre-recorded history and 
Is embarrassingly evident In present day understandings of the biologi­
cal determinants of behavior. However, progress In neurobehavioral 
understanding h$s Indicated that the brain Is the principal 'controller' 
of behavior. This has not always been accepted as the case. While 
attempts to understand brain functions are quite old, even the locali­
zation of the 'mind' at or within the brain was a matter of some doubt 
until the middle of the nineteenth century (Boring, 1957) . Speculations 
concerning neurobehavioral relationships reached a ridiculous extreme 
In the teachings of phrenology which ascribed the control of highly com­
plex behaviors, such as "cautiousness" and "Individuality", to specific 
cortical areas whose relative Importance In the overall behavior of a 
given Individual was Indicated by cranial bumps which reflected the 
relative size of the particular underlying cortical area. These bumps 
varied from Individual to Individual and therefore differences In behav­
ior were explained through Implied differences In cortical structure.
Historians generally credit the school of phrenology with 
popularizing the possibility that particular parts of the brain con­
trolled particular 'organs' of separate mental faculties. This move­
ment originated from the works of Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) and was 
formalized and given the name phrenology by his pupil J. G. Spurzhelm 
(1776-1832). While phrenology made many assumptions which are not 
granted today, such as assuming a correlation between the shape of the 
skull and the conformations of the brain as well as the assumption that 
the behavior and personality of man were Innately determined. Its most
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enduring principle was that of brain localization of function (Krech, 
1963).
Despite Gall's expertise as an anatomist, the extreme views of 
phrenology were generally opposed by the scientific world in the early 
nineteenth century. Pierre Flourens (1794-1867), the French experimen­
tal neurologist, is the one man credited with discrediting phrenology 
(Boring, 1957; Krech, 1963). While introducing the ablation technique 
and the use of laboratory observations to the study of brain-behavior 
relationships, Flourens also divided the nervous system into six sepa­
rate units which could be isolated and experimentally studied. These 
units were the cerebral hemispheres, the cerebellum, the corpora quadri- 
gemina, the medulla oblongata, the spinal cord and the nerves. Although 
granting specific properties, functions, and effects to these units, 
Flourens considered the nervous system to have a unity which resulted 
from an action commune in addition to the action propre of the parts. 
"Unity was considered to be the great reigning principle; it was every­
where, it dominated everything. The nervous system thus formed but a 
unitary system." (Boring, 1957).
By bringing neurobehavioral studies into the laboratory and 
applying the ablation technique, "Flourens radically changed the origi­
nal Gall-Spurzheim question and thereby altered the nature of the 
answer." (Krech, 1963, p. 40). In place of the uncontrolled clinical 
observations and anecdotal material of the phrenologists, Flourens 
surgically destroyed specific brain areas and observed changes in his 
subjects. However, Flourens' work was not without its limitations.
While attacking phrenological accounts of cortical functioning Flourens
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employed subjects with small amounts of cortex--hens and pigeons. The
lack of adequate methods of recording, measuring and distinguishing
behavior patterns and capacities obviously prejudiced Flourens' results
as well as those of the phrenologists. The Inadequacies of Flourens'
methods can be seen In the following exerpts reported by Krech (1963) In
which Flourens Is addressing the question of whether
...all these perceptions and all these faculties occupy
the same seat In the organs, or Is there, for each of 
them, a seat different from that of the others?
I carefully removed the whole anterior portion of 
the right cerebral lobe of a pigeon In successive layers, 
and the whole superior and middle of the left.
Vision weakened more and more, very gradually, as
the extirpation progressed, and was finally lost on both 
sides only when the layers, near the central node of both 
lobes, were removed.
But as soon as vision was lost, so was audition, 
and, together with vision and audition, all Intellectual 
and perceptual faculties.
As the ablation progressed, vision diminished grad­
ually and noticeably; audition weakened as did vision; 
all the other faculties In the same manner; as soon as 
one of these was completely lost, so were they all.
...as soon as one perception Is lost, all are lost; as 
soon as one faculty disappears, all disappear. There 
are not, therefore, different sites for the different 
faculties, nor for the different perceptions.
Unity Is the grand principle which reigns.
Thus while Flourens deserves much credit for establishing 
neurobehavioral research as a laboratory science it Is obvious that his 
techniques of behavioral evaluation fell short of currently accepted 
methods. In effect, his approach to the study of behavior was little.
If any, advancement over the Impressionistic techniques of phrenology. 
"This, of course, cannot be taken as a criticism of Flourens~-we could
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hardly expect him to invent and develop a new science of animal behavior 
in addition to a neurological technique." (Krech, 1963, p. 41).
Advances in Neurobehavioral Conceptualization:
The Clinic and the Laboratory
Flourens' ideas of the action commune of the nervous system 
carried the day for nearly half a century but there was some opposition 
based upon clinical observations of limited paralysis and limited cere­
bral lesions. Head (1926) cites many writings of Bouillaud (1796-1881) 
to this effect. Gradually developments in the clinic and the labora­
tory began to suggest that the reigning principle of the nervous system 
might be that of the action propre of its perhaps previously undefined 
parts. The next period in the history of brain-behavior research be­
longs to the Clinicans--Bouillaud, Broca (1824-1880) and Hughlings 
Jackson (1835-1911) and another group of experimenters--Fritsch (1838- 
1927), Hitzig (1838-1907) and David Ferrier (1843-1928). These clini- 
cans and experimenters constituted the French, English, and German 
champions of the localization hypothesis (Krech, 1963).
Despite Bouillaud's writings in 1825 and again in 1839 in 
support of the Gallian motion of localization, this position was not 
afforded much credence by the scientific community until Broca's start­
ling pronouncement in 1861. Bouillaud had argued that the faculty of 
speech was situated in the anterior lobes. However, according to Head 
(1926) "...the bogey of phrenology as well as the findings that speech 
could be gravely affected although the lesion was not situated in the 
frontal lobes..." distracted from Bouillaud's assertions of localiza­
tion. Discussion of localization continued over the years and once in
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1848, Bouillaud offered five hundred francs to anyone who would bring 
him an example of a severe lesion of the anterior lobes of the brain 
unaccompanied by disturbance of speech (Head, 1926, p. 17).
In April, 1861, Paul Broca began a series of investigations 
which lead to the conclusion that the center for articulated speech is 
located at the base of the third frontal convolution of the left cere­
bral hemisphere. Boring states that Broca's famous observation was in 
itself very simple and that its merit lay in his "...careful examination 
of a clean-cut case which chance threw into his hands and in the imme­
diacy with which he seized upon the broader implications." (Boring, 
1957, p. 71). This "simple" observation, determined by "chance" does 
indeed appear to be an accident in the history of science. Or was it?
Head concludes that "... in 1861, the air was again full of 
the localization of cerebral functions, and this question was liable to 
crop up with any excuse, in scientific discussions." (Head, 1926, p. 
17). And Boring relates that "...for many years French surgeons...had 
been doubting Flourens' doctrine of the unity of the nervous system and 
believing that they must find more specific localization of function 
within it." (Boring, 1957, p. 71). Thus by chance Broca, during this 
pregnant time, acquired a patient with "aphemia" (possessing the general 
faculty of language but unable to speak even though the musculature of 
the larynx and articulatory organs was capable of normal movement, there 
was no other paralysis to interfere with speech, and the patient was 
intelligent enough to speak) whose timely death allowed for an autopsy 
to be performed in time for Broca to present the brain before the 
Soci/t/ d'Anthropologie the next day, April 18, 1861. Other cases soon
followed to support this one and soon the principle of localization was 
firmly entrenched in scientific circles. In 1874, Wernicke concluded 
"...the sensory images of speech..." are localized in a zone of the 
cortex of the left hemisphere.
The descriptions of two isolated areas of the 
brain in which corresponding lesions led to distur­
bances of such different, functions caused unprecedented 
activity on the part of investigators of cerebral 
localization. These cases provoked the suggestion 
that other mental processes, even the most complex, 
may be localized in comparatively small areas of the 
cerebral cortex and that, in fact the cortex is an 
aggregate of separate 'centers' whose cell groups 
are 'depots' of different mental faculties. (Luria,
1966, p. 11).
It was also about this time (1860's-1870's) that the famous 
English neurologist, Hughlings Jackson, first presented his ideas con­
cerning the importance of the localization properties of epileptic 
seizures. "For him, the study of focal seizures became the starting 
point for the study of all seizures; the study of seizures became the 
starting point for the study of localization of function within the 
nervous system." (Penfield & Jasper, 1954). While Krech (1963). also 
includes Hughlings Jackson among the defenders of the localization of 
function position this might be the case only as it applies to Jackson's 
speculations about separate motor centers in the brain. Both Head 
(1926) and Luria (1966) consider Jackson to be against ideas of strict 
localization of function for speech but, as Head points out, Jackson 
himself is difficult to interpret on this point. Head quotes Jackson 
as saying
Whilst I believe that the hinder part of the left 
frontal convolution is the part most often damaged, I 
do not localize speech in any such small part of the
brain. To locate the damage which destroys speech and 
to localize speech are two different things. The damage 
is in my experience always in the region of the corpus 
striatum. (Head, 1926, p. 50).
Luria interprets Jackson as saying that the localization of a 
sympton following a circumscribed lesion in the CNS is not equivalent 
to the localization of the particular function (Luria, 1966, p. 18). 
However, Head (1926) points out that few people recognized that Jackson 
did not postulate a separate center for speech.
Apart from the findings of Broca and Wernicke two other de­
velopments about this time contributed to the view that complex mental 
processes can be narrowly localized in circumscribed areas of the cere­
bral cortex. Both Luria (1966) and Boring (1957) emphasize the influ­
ence of (1) British Associationism, which proposed that human mental 
activity is based upon the association of sensation and ideas, and (2) 
progress in anatomy and physiology as important factors in the favor­
able reception of the ideas of the localizationists in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The suspicion that the cortex was replete 
with various depots for the control of their respective behaviors 
received much encouragement from discoveries in histological techniques 
which demonstrated that the brain was composed of an almost infinite 
number of separate cells as opposed to the concept of homogeneous neural
mass.
For the associationists, mind is composed of an 
infinitude of separate ideas, just as the brain is con­
stituted of an infinitude of cells. But these ideas are 
bound together into more complex ideas or into higher 
mental processes by a huge number of associations, just 
as the nerve cells are connected by fibers.... The 
important point is that the new picture of the brain... 
bore a close resemblance to the new picture of the mind
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that associationism yielded... the new knowledge of the 
division of the brain into many tiny connected units 
implied that sometime further separation of localized 
mental functions, like ideas, was to be sought. (Boring,
1957, p. 70).
The trend toward an increasing acceptance of the position of 
narrow localization of function was further strengthened by laboratory 
findings, during the early 1870's, which suggested a possible 'struc­
tural' bases for behavior. That is, the discoveries of Fritsch and 
Hitzig (1870) which showed that stimulation of certain cortical areas 
was followed by contraction of certain muscles was soon followed by 
Betz' (1874) finding that the cortical zone discovered by Fritsch and 
Hitzig was structurally distinguishable from adjacent cortical areas.
The motor areas were found to structurally differ from other cortical 
zones by the presence of giant pryamidal cells.
The localization of motor activity to discrete brain sites, 
by electrical stimulation procedures, influenced Ferrier who employed 
this technique in an examination of the cortices of several species.
"The net result of Ferrier's work was the final (to date) establishment 
of the principle of localization of sensory and motor function in the 
brain." (Krech, 1963, p. 49). While Ferrier located vision in the 
occipital lobes it was Munk who in accordance with (1) Johannes Muller's 
doctrine of specific nerve energies which encouraged a belief in the 
existence of five centers, one for each sense, and (2) the facts of 
neuroanatomy which included the semi-decussation of the optic nerves at 
the chiasma, demonstrated that the removal of an occipital lobe is not 
followed by complete blindness in either eye but instead there is blind­
ness for half of the visual field for each eye (hemianopia) (Boring,
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1957, p. 75). Function could be understood in terms of structure.
From the localization of phrenology to the unity of Flourens 
and now back again to a localized "scientific phrenology", the pendulum 
of opinion swayed--to and fro. First one, then the other, and now the 
first again! Fickle science! Or is it? With respect to phrenology 
perhaps the question is inappropriate but both the action commune of 
Flourens and the localized aphemia of Broca carried the weight of scien­
tific support for their respective day. Both Flourens' and Broca's 
findings were accepted by the scientific community because they employed 
the "scientific method". Why then the dissimilarity of results?
Boring credits Fritsch and Hitzig, as referring to "...the 
discrepancy between dogma (the action commune of Flourens?) and experi­
ment to technique; 'the method', they remarked, 'creates the results.'" 
(Boring, 1957, p. 73). However, Krech states that Flourens "...radi­
cally changed the original Gall-Spurzheim question and thereby altered 
the nature of the answer," (Krech, 1963, p. 40) and credits Flourens 
with stating, in 1842, "It is the method which gives the results" and 
to this Krech adds "...the method having first shaped the question." 
Method, therefore, appears to be all important, shaping both the ques­
tion and the answer. What then determines method? Would it be too 
bold to answer--"theory"?
The Behavioral Emphasis 
A new method of neurobehavioral investigation, born of a new 
theoretical orientation, was to be launched in the early nineteen hun­
dreds. By this time psychology had become divorced from philosophy and 
was an independent science which advocated that behavior be studied
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objectively and measured quantitatively. The importance of this new 
emphasis to future neurobehavioral research was monumental.
The progress in neural-behavioral research had 
thus far spiraled around significant advances in neuro­
logical techniques'— from the careful anatomical studies 
of Gall and Spurzheim, through the skillful ablation pro­
cedures of Flourens, to the electrical stimulation tech­
niques of Fritsch and Hitzig and of Ferrier. The 
development of the other variable— behavior— lagged 
behind....in the laboratory no advances in the measure­
ment of behavior had been made since the time of Flourens. 
Impressionistic observations of behavior was still the 
custom in the laboratory.
With the growth of the new science of animal 
psychology--at the very end of the nineteenth century-- 
this one sided development was changed. (Krech, 1963, 
p. 54).
The new discipline, animal psychology, allowed for a new 
method— objective and quantitative analysis of behavior. One of the 
first to employ this new method as an approach to neurobehavioral prob­
lems was Shepherd Ivory Franz (1874-1933), who began extirpating brain 
tissue to see what loss in behavior would result (Herrnstein & Boring, 
1966). Franz' work is historically important for at least three rea­
sons: (1) behavior was examined in terms of its objective complexity,
such as the learning (problem solving behavior) and retention of habits, 
instead of either such broad terms as "will" and "intellect" or the 
traditional simple sensory reactions or motor reflexes, and the effects 
of destroying various neural regions were evaluated in terms of these 
objectively identifiable complex behaviors; (2) the pendulum of locali­
zation began to swing back toward Flourens, and perhaps toward Jackson, 
and away from the "scientific phrenology" of Ferrier and others; and 
(3) Franz had a student named Karl Spencer Lashley (1890-1959).
From studies dealing with the recovery of habits which were
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lost following one and even two-stage brain removal surgeries (1902; 
cited in Krech, 1963) and observations on the apparent lack of locali­
zation or "fixity" or "definiteness of connection" of specific motor 
behaviors (1915; in Herrnstein & Boring, 1966) Franz concluded that the 
localization of function position was weak on both behavioral and ana­
tomical grounds. "Franz's contribution seemed largely to be negative: 
cerebral localization is not precise." (Herrnstein & Boring, 1966).
His student, K. S. Lashley, whose experiments, in his own words, 
"...constitute the first attempt to apply quantitative methods to both 
neurological and behavioral data..." and who is considered to be "...one 
of the most influential and productive psychologists who has worked in 
the field of neural-behavioral studies," (Krech, 1963, p. 55) left a 
much deeper mark upon the field of neurobehavioral investigations.
Lashley also concluded that localization was "not precise" 
but to summarize his work as merely supporting the earlier positions of 
Flourens and Franz would be both an understatement and an error. The 
importance of Lashley's work is best understood not just in terms of 
what he did, and found, but in terms of the manner in which he under­
took to examine behavioral theory in the laboratory and the impact of 
his work upon nearly all behavioral theorizing from that date on.
In 1929, Lashley published Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence :
A Quantitative Study of Injuries to the Brain, the work for which he is 
most remembered and in which he formulated the now famous laws of "equi- 
potentiality" and "mass action". Lashley coined the term "equipoten- 
tiality" in describing the functional significance of the rat cortex 
and defined the term as "...the apparent capacity of any intact part of
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a functional area to carry out, with or without reduction in efficiency,
the functions, which are lost by destruction of the whole." (Lashley,
1929, p. 25). Lashley also popularized the concept of "mass action" to
further describe neural functioning. The law of mass action states
...that the equipotentiality is not absolute but is 
subject to a law of mass action whereby the efficiency 
of performance of an entire complex function may be 
reduced in proportion to the extent of brain injury 
within an area whose parts are not more specialized 
for one component of the function than for another.
(Lashley, 1929, p. 25).
D. 0. Hebb (1963) introduced a publication of Lashley's 1929 
book by saying "It is not far-fetched to date the beginning of the 
modern period of psychology from the publication of this book in 1929." 
The validity of this statement is best understood in terms of the 
points that Hebb emphasized, in the introduction, concerning psychologi­
cal behavioral theorizing prior to and around the time that Lashley 
began his life's work.
Hebb argues that behavior theory per se was strongly influ­
enced by the 1929 book. "The behavior theory that existed before its 
publication was mostly cast in neurological terms, and concerned ideas 
that could never be the same again.... None of this carefree neurolo- 
gizing was possible after 1930, at least not for a psychologist."
Hebb points out that from Wundt onward psychology had been predominantly 
physiological psychology, "...however fanciful..." In the decades pre- 
ceeding Lashley's work "consciousness" had meant "cortical" and auto­
matic "unconscious" habits were simply shortcircuited and handled 
"subcortically", Physiological behavioral theory had become dependent 
upon arguments utilizing concepts such as synaptic resistance, detailed
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localizations of cortical functions, and new paths from point to point 
in the cortex for new habits. "Now, suddenly, it appeared from 
Lashley's work that such ideas were fantasy, not science." The destruc­
tion of the neurological basis for the then current behavior theory was 
not the guiding purpose of Lashley's initial explorations in this area. 
Far from it!
Lashley was a thoroughgoing behaviorist having encountered 
John B. Watson at Johns Hopkins, in 1912, when Watson was preparing 
what Hebb calls "the Behaviorist manifesto". Lashley was only twenty- 
two years old at the time and the next six years during which he 
collaborated closely with Watson in a number of studies undoubtedly 
influenced him strongly. During this time Lashley met another man who 
was to strongly influence his future--Shepherd Ivory Franz. Watson's 
monistic explanation of behavior included ideas of synaptic modifica­
tion and the formation of stimulus-response connections through the 
cortex. While with Franz, Lashley assisted in two studies of the 
effect of cortical extirpations on habit in the rat. Lashley later 
began the work, which was the basis for the 1929 book, of demonstrating 
the soundness of Watson's ideas of the neural counterpart of observable 
behavior. "But every experiment he did came out wrong." He finally 
abandoned this aspect of the theory but Hebb states that Lashley 
"...never abandoned Watson's real aim of achieving a completely monis­
tic and objective explanation of behavior."
Just exactly how did Lashley's experiments come out "wrong"? 
Current behavior theory held that learning or habit formation was the 
end result of chains of associations between stimuli and reflexes which
16
produced an overt series of reflexes (behavior) and that these associa­
tions or growth relationships between reflex components occurred in 
specific neural locations. Lashley concluded that
The experimental findings have never fitted into 
such a scheme. Rather, they have emphasized the unitary 
character of every habit, the impossibility of stating 
any learning as a concatenation of reflexes, and the 
participation of large masses of nervous tissue in the
functions rather than the development of restricted
conduction-paths. (Lashley, 1929, p. 14).
Although there were instances of apparent habit localization 
such as a loss of retention of a double-latch box problem following 
frontal lesions but not others and loss of a brightness discrimination 
following posterior but not anterior lesions, the fact that identical 
lesions prior to training did not affect rate of learning contributed 
heavily to Lashley's conclusions that all behaviors were probably not 
highly localized in cerebral depots. While demonstrating that for 
habits involving unique visual properties (such as the elevated maze) 
localization may be an important factor, for other tasks which are not
so dependent upon a particular sensory mode, such as Maze III, this was
not the case. Equipotentiality was said to hold for "...the associa­
tion areas and for functions more complex than simple sensitivity or 
motor co-ordination." (Lashley, 1929, p. 25).
Lashley's views of equipotentiality and mass action came from
investigations of the effects of size and location of cortical lesions
upon performance of rats in his number three (III) maze (Figure 1).
Using this maze, some of Lashley's findings were:
(1) The maze habit, formed before cerebral insult, is 
disturbed by lesions in any part of the cortex. The 
amount of reduction in efficiency in performance is 




Figure 1. The eight cul-de-sac maze used by Lashley. 
The start-box and goal-box were equipped with swinging doors.
{ From Lashley 1929 )
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of locus. (2) The capacity to form maze habits is 
reduced by destruction of cerebral tissue. (3) The 
reduction is roughly proportional to the amount of 
destruction. (4) The same retardation in learning is 
produced by equal amounts of destruction in any of the 
cyto-architectural fields. Hence the capacity to 
learn the maze is dependent upon the amount of func­
tional cortical tissue and not upon its anatomical 
specialization.
From these findings, Lashley concluded that
...the learning process and the retention of habits 
are not dependent upon any finely localized struc­
tural changes within the cerebral cortex. The results 
are incompatible with theories of learning by changes 
in synaptic structure, or with any theories which assume 
that particular neural integrations are dependent upon 
definite anatomical paths specialized for them. Inte­
gration cannot be expressed in terms of connections 
between specific neurons. (Lashley, 1929, p. 176).
Lashley's conclusions that no part of the rat neocortex is 
more essential than any other part of the neocortex for the mastery of 
a complex maze habit is widely accepted today (Chow, 1968; Deese, 1968; 
John, 1967). However, at least two lines of evidence suggest that a re­
examination of some of Lashley's findings is in order. First, there is 
evidence that the rat neocortex is not equipotential with respect to 
maze mastery. Second, advances in techniques of behavioral analysis 
which have demonstrated the importance of many discrete brain loci in a 
wide variety of behaviors (such as the role of the septum in active 
versus passive avoidance) suggests the possibility that a more micro­
scopic examination of maze behaviors per se could point to previously 
undetected localization properties in discrete cortical regions.
The following sections will deal with (1) evidence concerning 
localization of function in the rat cortex for the maze habit, (2) con­
siderations of the complexity of behavior, (3) an analysis of the III
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maze habit, (4) a question of neuroanatomical logic in approaching the 
study of localization and (5) the current problem.
Evidence for Localization 
Pickett (1952), though not employing a Lashley type III maze, 
reported that anterior cortical lesions produced greater deficits upon 
maze retention than did posterior lesions. However, Thompson (1959a) 
using a water maze version of the Lashley III maze, found bilateral pos­
terior cortical lesions produced greater deficits in maze behaviors 
than did bilateral anterior lesions. Posterior lesions resulted in 
significant deficits in both blind and nonblind subjects while anterior 
lesions produced deficits only in subjects which were enucleated prior 
to maze training. "It would seem, therefore, that large bilateral 
anterior lesions are effective in impairing learning only when visual 
cues are absent during the learning period." (Thompson, 1959a, p. 503). 
The finding that anterior lesions were primarily effective in blind 
subjects is also inconsistent with the concept of "mass action".
In a similar study, Thompson (1959b) found that, in subjects 
which learned the maze with vision intact and were later blinded, 
anterior lesions resulted in significantly more errors in retention 
than did posterior lesions. No significant retention deficit was ob­
served in subjects with posterior lesions. In nonblind subjects pos­
terior lesions did produce a significant retention deficit while 
anterior lesions had no significant effect on maze retention.
While the results of these studies are difficult to interpret, 
they do point to the possibility of localization of function in the rat 
neocortex with respect to maze mastery.
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Behavioral Considerations
Lashley recognized the importance of including in his investi­
gations of brain-behavior relationships a wide variety of tasks, 
especially those involving "...a more complex habit". Both behavioral 
definition and response complexity were important factors in determin­
ing task selection. In an early paper, with S. I. Franz, both of these 
factors were presented as justification for using the inclined-plane box 
in addition to the simple, one cul-de-sac, maze in assessing loss of 
habit following brain damage.
The simple maze offered some disadvantages for a study 
of retention owing to the fact that it did not require 
a reaction that was sufficiently well defined to be 
certainly recognizable in the retention tests. It 
seemed best therefore to use some more complex habit in 
the later experiments for the sake of getting a more 
clearly defined series of activities and also with the 
possibility that the more complex habit, involving 
different types of reaction, might reveal a selective 
effect of the cerebral lesion upon certain types of 
activity. (Lashley & Franz, 1917, p. 86).
Thus while granting that complex habits could involve
"...different types of reaction..." in terms of one task, the inclined-
plane box, this was apparently not the case for the III maze habit
which was considered to be unitary.
None of the studies of learning or retention of the
mazes after cerebral lesions has given the slightest 
indication that the maze habit is made up of inde­
pendent associational elements.... The diversities of 
behavior, such as disorientation, tendencies to per­
severation, and the like, correspond somewhat with 
the magnitude of lesion but not at all with the locus, 
and seemed to represent diverse degrees of deteriora­
tion rather than specific defects. (Lashley, 1929, 
p. 141).
These conclusions are not surprising in view of the unitary 
behavioral assessment employed by Lashley--culs-de-sac (the dead end
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areas in each row) entered.
The III Maze Habit
There is a possibility that the primary dependent variable 
utilized by Lashley in assessing maze performance was not as sensitive 
to the various effects of brain damage as originally thought. In evalu­
ating the effects of brain lesions upon the learning and retention of 
habits Lashley employed a wide variety of tasks but placed primary 
emphasis upon performance in the III maze. The reasoning for this is 
fairly straightforward. The III maze was believed to be the most com­
plex of the various mazes utilized in Lashley's studies (with the poss­
ible exception of maze IV) having eight culs-de-sac and requiring 
alternate right and left turns in the true path (Figure 1). As entry 
into a cul-de-sac constituted the commonly used error measure and this 
maze had more culs-de-sac than the other mazes, then this was the most 
"complex" maze. The complexity was considered an important factor in 
assessing the effects of brain damage for several reasons. The more 
complex the problem, the greater the possibility that its solution was 
not dependent upon any particular sensory input. Also
The simpler problem offers difficulties which are 
not much greater for animals with brain lesions than 
for normal ones; and correspondingly, the difficulty 
does not greatly increase with increasing magnitude of 
brain injury. The more complex problem, on the other 
hand, is more difficult for animals with lesions than 
for normals; and as the magnitude of the lesion 
increases, the difficulty of the problem becomes pro­
gressively greater. (Lashley, 1929, p. 74).
While the above conclusions were not applicable to all the 
various tasks--in learning the brightness discrimination or the double­
platform box the operated animals showed no retardation--they are
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consistent with the maze results where complexity is measured in terms 
of culs-de-sac. Thus the III maze was considered to be the most sensi­
tive of the various tasks to the effects of brain damage, in both 
theoretical and empirical aspects, when performance was measured in 
terras of culs-de-sac entries and trial latencies.
Performance on the III maze can be evaluated in terras of 
behaviors other than simple cul-de-sac entry. Cul-de-sac entry per se 
is by no means a complete assessment of the habit complexity of the III 
maze. An inspection of Figure 1 reveals that the III maze is made up 
of several rows with each row being connected to the others via either 
alternate left or right end openings (doors). Thus the most efficient 
strategy for mastery of this maze habit would be upon entering row one, 
turn right, go through the door leading to row two, turn left, go 
through the door into row three, turn right, etc. Two classes of behav­
ior essential for efficient maze maneuvering are immediately obvious: 
the rat must go through openings (doors) in order to get to the next 
row and upon entering a row the rat must alternate in either a right or 
left direction to the door leading to that row. These behaviors will 
be termed "door" and "alternation" behaviors respectively. Thus a rat 
which upon entering row one turned left and then also ran past the door 
leading into row two, turned around and ran past the same door again, 
and then returned and went through the door into row two, would have 
committed one alternation error and two door errors while in row one of 
the maze.
It would not be too difficult to imagine either the alterna­
tion error (behavior) as being related to the subject's ability to
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remember the correct sequence of turns in the true path and the sub­
ject's own position with respect to this sequence, or the door error as 
being related to the degree and control of locomotor activity. A sub­
ject with a deficit in either spatial orientation or temporal sequencing 
could commit more alternation than door errors while a subject with 
visual-perceptual failings (cannot see the door) or with deficits in 
locomotor control (inability to stop) might commit more door than alter­
nation errors. Thus, while the two errors could certainly have many 
common elements, it is quite possible that they could reflect separate 
and distinct behaviors required for efficient maze performance. The 
hypothetical rat above, scored by the culs-de-sac entered as the error 
measure, would simply have been observed to make two errors yet the 
same rat also made one alternation and two door errors. Thus utilizing 
both door and alternation error concepts in an analysis of III maze 
behaviors could represent a quantitative as well as a qualitative 
advancement over an analysis of maze performance solely in terms of 
culs-de-sac entered.
Furthermore, these two error measures have been found to be 
valid descriptors of behavior in terms of maze mastery. Defining a door 
error as being committed whenever a subject goes past a door, in either 
direction, without entering, which leads to the next row between the 
subject and the goal-box, a large number of door errors are possible 
for each row per trial on the maze. However, this error quickly drops 
(by five or six trials) to a very low level in the behavior of normal 
rats (White & Vardiman, 1964; White & McGee, 1964). Jackson & Strong 
(1969) and Bender, Hostetter & Thomas (1968) have shown this error to
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be significantly elevated in subjects with limbic system damage (pri­
marily the hippocampus).
The alternation error, which consists of the subject turning 
in the direction opposite the next door immediately upon entering a new 
row of the maze, can only be committed once per row. This is a more 
difficult behavior for normal subjects to master (White & Vardiman,
1964) and should be sensitive to subtle changes in behavior following 
brain damage. This would seem to be especially true if the brain 
damage resulted in a deficit in temporal sequencing ability.
In summary, it would appear that while there are at least two 
types of logically derivable behaviors (door and alternation) which can 
be evaluated during performance of the maze habit, performance measured 
purely in terms of culs-de-sac entered would fail to distinguish between 
these behaviors. A rat which always entered a blind cul immediately 
upon entering a row (alternation error) would not be distinguishable 
from one which always ran past a door into a cul (door error) prior to 
going through the door into the next row. %  say that these behaviors 
are identical, and should be so judged, is to ignore the moment to 
moment changes in response requirement during a successful maze per­
formance.
Neuroanatomical Considerations 
Although the studies of Pickett (1952) and Thompson (1959) 
question the concept of rat neocortical equipotentiality, the results 
of these studies are so divergent that an interpretation is somewhat 
difficult. Pickett found that anterior cortical lesions severely 
impaired maze performance, as compared to posterior lesions, while
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Thompson's findings were just the opposite of this.
The contradictory nature of these studies could be due to one 
or more of several factors: (1) different type mazes were used in the
two studies; (2) different behaviors could have constituted "errors" in 
the two studies; (3) the use of only two cortical zones might have 
allowed for the inadvertent inclusion in one experimenter's "anterior" 
region, structures which another researcher would consider "posterior" 
and vice versa. In light of this last possibility, it would appear that 
studies of this nature could profit by employing three cortical zones: 
anterior, middle and posterior. Thus, even though boundaries between 
two areas may overlap, and therefore produce ambiguous or even contra­
dictory results, with three areas one area should be significantly 
different from the other two, in terms of resulting behaviors, if true 
cortico-behavioral differences exist.
An examination of the various lesion sites employed by Lashley 
indicates that a rather non-systematic approach determined their 
selection. Thus while many subjects had lesions in common areas, there 
was usually enough individuality of lesion shape and extent to make 
direct comparisons between various sites somewhat difficult. It would 
also appear that most attempts to control for the size of the lesion 
were employed after histological examination and were not a part of the 
surgical procedure. While this type of comparison is logically allow­
able, the failure to control for mass and site as part of a systematic 
experimental analysis often resulted in few direct comparisons between 
subjects which were completely satisfactory in terms of site and amount 
of brain damage.
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Another area which needs some clarification is the relative 
effects of cortical versus subcortical lesions upon maze behaviors.
The reason for this is although Lashley interpreted most of his lesions 
in terms of "cortical" effects, many cases were reported with damage to 
subcortical structures. As there was no significant difference in maze 
performance (culs-de-sac entered) between cortically lesioned subjects 
with and without accompanying thalamic lesions, thalamic damage was con­
sidered to be relatively unimportant as was damage to the striatum, 
septum, or hippocampal structures "...and so we cannot ascribe the 
correlation to injury to subcortical structures." (Lashley, 1929, p. 
64). The studies of Jackson & Strong (1969) and Bender, Hostetter and 
Thomas (1968) would indicate that this is not the case as the hippo­
campus is involved in one type of possible cul entry (the door error). 
Again, it should be noted that the failure to analyze the maze habit in 
terms of its components automatically precludes the possibility that 
different habit components may be differentially associated with the 
activity of different brain sites such as cortical versus subcortical 
structures.
Current theories of neurological functioning would certainly 
stress the importance of, at least, limbic mechanisms in a set of behav­
iors as complex as maze mastery. The previously mentioned studies of 
Jackson & Strong (1969) and Bender, Hostetter and Thomas (1968) demon­
strate the importance of hippocampal functioning with regard to the 
execution of door errors in the Lashley III maze. Thomas, Moore, John 
& Hunt (1959), using the Lashley III maze with an error measure which 
in effect included door errors, found that septal lesions greatly
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impaired maze performance. The findings of these studies suggest that 
much caution should be exercised when interpreting maze deficits in 
purely "cortical" terms.
The Problem
The previous discussion has suggested that it is not unusual 
for opinion and fact to vary from time to time concerning the issue of 
localization versus non-localization of function and that there exists 
a need to re-evaluate at least one presently held view of brain func­
tioning; the equipotentiality of the rat neocortex with respect to maze 
mastery. With respect to the first suggestion, the implication was 
presented that the pendulum of opinion concerning this question has 
been moved by method as much as by fact. Here the suggestion was that 
theory dictates method which in turn generates fact. Somewhere in this 
collection of forces and events one finds the influence of certain 
individuals. The theory, the method and the individual all interact to 
produce the fact. A consideration of these factors led to the formation 
of the second suggestion. Explicitly these considerations were as 
follows: (1) current neurobehavioral theory could profit from new
information concerning the question of localization of function; (2) 
much of the support for the non-localization of function position is 
based upon a behavioral measurement (culs-de-sac entry) which may not 
be sufficiently sensitive to distinguish between the functionings of 
various neural locations in the acquisition or retention of the III 
maze habit; (3) other evidence does suggest that the rat neocortex 
exhibits localization of function for the maze habit; (4) the use of 
both the door and alternation errors as dependent variables which might
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selectively reflect changes in activity level, ability to orient in the 
maze, perseveration, etc., could contribute greatly to an analysis of 
maze behaviors; and (5) a systematic examination of three cortical 
zones, with each subject receiving lesions in only one zone, would help 
to eliminate confusion resulting from the individuality of lesions in 
some studies and should clarify some of the ambiguity of other studies 




On the basis of the previous discussion an experiment was 
undertaken to Investigate the role of three bilateral cortical zones In 
the acquisition of the III maze habit as measured by door and alter­
nation errors.
Method
Subjects. Eighteen albino rats, approximately 90-110 days 
old, were randomly assigned to one of three cortical lesion groups such 
that there were six subjects (S^) In each group. The lesion sites 
(groups) were designated anterior cortex (AC), middle cortex (MC) and 
posterior cortex (PC) (Figure 2).
Surgery. All surgery was performed In one session while the 
animal was anesthetized with sodium pentobarbital and was positioned In 
a Kopf stereotaxic apparatus. Bilateral cortical ablation was accom­
plished by suction removal of exposed cortex. Cortical destruction was 
primarily restricted to the dorsal surface of the brain, as far lateral 
as the temporal ridge. The three cortical ablation zones were defined 
In terms of cranial landmarks as follows: anterior zones— from the
frontal pole to a point approximately 2 mm posterior to bregma; middle
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Figure 2. A unilateral representation of the three cortical 
zones used In this study.
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zone--from bregma to a point approximately 5 mm posterior to bregma; 
and posterior zone~-from a point approximately 5 mm posterior to bregma 
to lambda.
In order to make complete lesions over the prescribed surface 
areas it was necessary to remove all of the bone over that area. Much 
care was taken to insure that a minimal amount of CNS damage occurred 
during skull removal. This procedure consisted of these steps: (1)
expose skull and scrape clean in prescribed area; (2) mark skull zone 
to be removed; (3) drill small hole through skull somewhere in pre­
scribed zone; and (4) enlarge opening to desired size by use of small 
bone rongeurs. After some practice one can acquire the skills neces­
sary to remove a large section of the skull without disrupting the 
dura.
Both hemisphere zones were exposed prior to the initiation of 
suction procedures as bleeding commenced concurrent with the invasion 
of the meninges. Continual flooding of the auctioning area with sterile 
physiological saline was necessary to remove blood and other fluids 
which produced visual interference.
After each hemisphere zone was suctioned, bleeding was checked 
by packing that area with sterile absorbable gelatin. An additional 
covering of gelatin was then placed over both zones. A thin layer of 
dental acrylic was deposited over the last gelatin layer and the scalp 
was sutured closed. Penicillin was topically applied to the wound and 
approximately 80,000 units of penicillin was injected intramuscularly.
Apparatus and procedures. The maze used in this study was a 
modification of Lashley's number III maze, having six rows instead of
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four (Figure 3). The internal dimensions of this maze are: wall
height - one foot; alley width ~ four inches; alley length - four feet; 
door width - four inches; start-box and goal-box width - four inches; 
start-box length - one foot; and goal-box length - eighteen inches.
The floor of the maze was made from 1/4 inch aluminum wire mesh.
Each _S was placed in the start-box for ten seconds and then 
allowed entry into the maze. As each row was entered the door was 
closed, by the experimenter (E), behind the ^ to prevent re-tracing.
Each ^ was allowed access to wet lab chow mash for 30 seconds in the 
goal-box and then returned to the home cage. All Ss received one trial 
per day for twenty consecutive days.
The dependent variables for the Lashley III were door errors 
and alternation errors. The door error consists simply of a _S going 
past a door (in either direction by at least half a body length) which 
leads to the next row or, in the case of row six, the goal-box. Several 
door errors may be made per row (Arrow #1, Figure 3). The alternation 
error consists of the _S upon entering a new row turning into the blind 
cul-de-sac, by at least half a body length, which is opposite in direc­
tion from the path leading to the door to the next row (Arrow #2,
Figure 3). Only one alternation error may be made per row. Both types 
of errors were determined by observation.
As each row was entered, and following commission of an error, 
the E pressed an appropriate key on a control box which was always held 
in the E's left hand. The right hand was used to operate recording 
switches and to replace doors to prevent the ^'s re-tracing between 












Figure 3. A modified version of the III maze having 
twelve culs-de-sac instead of eight or six rows instead of four. 
Arrow #1 represents a door error and arrow #2 represents an 
alternation error.
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eight individual channels of a multi-channel Esterline-Angus event 
recorder. Six of the switches corresponded to each of the rows while 
the other two switches corresponded to door and alternation errors.
The switch-pen combinations were so arranged that an easily readable 
permanent record of each ^'s maze performance, per trial, was obtained. 
The E first pressed the appropriate row switch and then pressed the 
appropriate error switch, if an error was committed. This allowed for 
an easy determination of what errors, if any, were committed in each 
row, per trial, by inspection of the chart record.
Approximately twenty-four hours after completion of maze 
training each ^ received a ten-minute period of activity assessment in 
an activity chamber which was designed to measure several types of 
activity (locomotor, head movement, etc.). The activity device used 
in this study was a LeHigh Valley photocell and quadrant counter appa­
ratus which was housed in a sound-dampening room. A count was elec­
tronically made whenever a ^ interrupted any of several photocell beams.
All ^s were tested in all phases of this study while between 
75% and 80% of their normal body weight. This was determined for each 
^ as follows; (1) on the 11th post-operative day, while all ^s were on 
ad libidum food and water, each ^ was weighed at the same time of day 
that the ̂  would be tested; (2) ad libidum weights were taken each day 
until a stable body weight was established or until five weights were 
obtained; (3) the average weight for the stable period of five weights 
obtained in step 2 was taken as the 100% body weight and each ^  was 
slowly deprived of food for a period of approximately ten days until 
the 75-80% body weight range was reached and then testing was initiated.
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Handling, weighing and testing were done at the same time each day for 
each ^ and only one E handled any given Each ^ was tested by the 
same E throughout the study and the assignment of ^s to each E was such 
that no one E tested more than one-half of the ^s in each group. The 
group identity of each ^ was also unknown to the E.
Histology. All ^s were sacrificed and their brains profused 
with 10% formalin. Amount of cortical destruction was estimated by 
inspection of the intact brain similar to that described by Lashley 
(1929). That is, the extent of the superficial lesions were determined 
by inspecting the intact brain and "...laid off on diagrams of the 
brain with proportional dividers". The areas of these lesions were 
finally measured from the diagrams with a planimeter and expressed as 
a percentage of the total surface area. All brains were then micro- 
tomed and stained to allow for an examination of thalamic degeneration. 
Sectioning was at 40 micron intervals and every third section was 
stained such that every other stained section was either a cell body 
(cresylecht violet) or a tract stain (Weil).
Results and Discussion
The two maze behaviors under investigation, door and alter­
nation errors, were not equally affected by the various cortical 
lesions. The alternation error exhibited striking equipotentiality. 
That is, all three cortical groups performed almost identically with 
respect to this behavior (Figure 4). Figure 4 also shows that the 
strong equipotentiality of the alternation error was not observed in 
the door error behaviors. The door error behavior was most pronounced 
in the middle cortical group. The high within-group variability of the
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A = Alternation Error 






Figure 4. The mean performance of each of the cortical 
groups in terms of door and alternation errors.
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door error behavior (Table 1) and the small number of cases in each
TABLE 1
TOTAL DOOR (De) AND ALTERNATION (Ae) ERRORS AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CORTICAL DESTRUCTION (%), BY 
SUBJECT, FOR THE THREE CORTICAL GROUPS
Anterior Middle Posterior
% De Ae % De Ae % De Ae
11.3 47 37 17.5 135 63 21.4 52 46
13.0 24 42 22.9 57 48 10.7 53 53
24.0 63 67 33.6 132 48 26.6 42 44
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group preclude any possibility of significant statistical differences 
between groups as measured by this behavior. One ^ died in the PC 
group reducing the total number of ^s to seventeen. A Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of variance (Siegel, 1956) of the total door errors, 
for twenty trials for the three groups produced an H of 4.62 which 
approached significance at the .10 level of confidence with two degrees 
of freedom. Despite the low level of significance between groups in 
terms of door errors, an examination of the data raised some interest­
ing questions concerning equipotentiality, mass action and behavior.
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Table 1 shows that the amount of cortex removed was not equal 
for the three groups, with the AC receiving much less damage than 
either of the other two groups. Yet in terms of alternation errors the 
AC group was similar to the other groups. In terms of door errors the 
AC group was intermediate to the MC and PC groups. If mass is the 
crucial factor in error production then increases in the amount of 
cortex destroyed in the AC group to a level comparable to the other
groups (for example— from 13% to 20%) should produce large increases in
both errors. In that case the PC group would be much lower in terms of
door errors than the other two groups and both the PC and MC groups
would be lower than the AC group in terms of alternation errors. There­
fore if mass is the critical factor in error production, given an equal 
amount of area destroyed and based on the data in Table 1, the PC group 
would make less door errors than the AC or MC groups while the AC group 
would make more alternation errors than either of the other groups.
If the rat neocortex is equipotential with respect to maze 
mastery and is therefore subject to the law of mass action in terms of 
neurobehavioral relationships then differences in amount of cortex des­
troyed should explain differences in observed behaviors. This was not 
the case for either error behavior. The correlations between errors 
and amount of cortical destruction were low and nonsignificant for both 
behaviors (R = + 0.076 for door errors and R = + .236 for alternation 
errors).
The two behaviors were significantly correlated with each 
other (R = + .53, p  ̂.05). This correlation was highest in the MC 
group (R = + .90, p .01), lower in the PC group (R = +.70) and absent
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in the AC group (R = + .08). Both errors were also significantly 
correlated with the ten minute activity score (alternation error: R =
+ .539, p ^  .05: door error; R = + .695, p ^ .01). However, there
were no significant activity differences between groups as measured by 
Mann-Whitney U comparisons (Siegel, 1956).
These findings, while indicating that equipotentiality may be 
a valid concept in terms of alternation errors, do raise questions con­
cerning the role of mass in terms of both maze behaviors and general 
activity. Thus the concept of equipotentiality is indirectly questioned 
by failings of the law of mass action as well as the finding that the 
door error does not appear to be as equipotential as the alternation 
error.
The two maze behaviors appear to be distinguishable in terms 
of both a logical analysis of the maze habit and in the manner in which 
they are affected by neural damage. One behavior, the alternation 
error, appears to be a model for the concept of equipotentiality but 
this is not the case for the door error. Both errors, however, appear 
to be independent of the concept of mass action. The findings raise 
new doubts concerning the generality of the laws of equipotentiality 
and mass action and suggest that while some behaviors may be subject to 
these laws other behaviors may not be so governed.
Experiment II
The findings of Experiment I, while questioning both the gen­
erality of the concepts of rat neocortical equipotentiality (for some 
behaviors) and mass action, also question the view that the maze habit 
is "unitary". Lashley (1929) concluded that there was no reason to
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suspect that the maze habit is made up of independent associational 
elements since the "diversities" of behavior resulting from brain damage 
appeared to be related not to site of damage but only to amount of 
damage (see earlier quote on p. 20). However, when the maze habit is 
viewed in terms of door and alternation behaviors, one behavior (door 
errors) is related to locus of lesion (middle cortical zone) while the 
other behavior (alternation errors) is not related to a particular 
cortical site. Thus in terms of cortical neurobehavioral mechanisms 
the maze habit is not unitary but can be viewed as consisting of two, 
possibly more, behaviors--door and alternation behaviors.
The small number of ^s employed in Experiment I discouraged 
an .extensive analysis of the data, yet the data did raise enough ques­
tions to warrant further investigations in this area. Specifically, 
some questions which need to be answered are: (1) can the results of
Experiment I be replicated in terms of the effects of cortical damage 
upon the two maze behaviors; (2) how will subcortical damage affect 
these behaviors; and (3) what are the dynamics of these behaviors?
The first two questions can be answered by simply testing the 
acquisition of these behaviors in cortically and subcortically damaged 
rats. The third question, concerning the nature of the behaviors per 
se, is more difficult to approach. As mentioned in Chapter I, the two 
behaviors can be distinguished in terms of their operationally defined 
requirements. That is, the door error is clearly distinguishable 
from the alternation error. However, it is important to know more about 
these behaviors than that they are simply distinct.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the door error on the III maze
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could be related to deficits in locomotor control or visual-perceptual 
failings. One measure of locomotor control could be the rate of acqui­
sition and extinction of a straight runway response. Basic failings in 
the execution of locomotor behaviors would interfere with the acquisi­
tion of a running response while failings of locomotor inhibition would 
interfere with the extinction of that response.
Visual-perceptual failings might also relate to door error 
activities. That is the rat may fail to see or recognize the opening 
(door) in the row wall. Thus door error behaviors in the III maze may 
be related to the ability to detect and enter breaks (openings) in a 
wall surface. This type of task can be seen in the "door error maze" 
(Figure 5), which requires the ^ to turn into an opening in one of the 
two row walls. A comparison of performance on this task with the III 
maze door errors is relevant to questions about the generality of the 
door error behavior. That is, if door errors in the III maze are 
determined by properties of the maze per se, such as might be the case 
with the alternation errors, then there should be little correspondence 
between door error performance in the III maze and performance in the 
DEM.
As mentioned in Chapter I also, the alternation error is 
probably related to the ^'s ability to remember the correct sequence 
of turns in the true path and the ^'s own position with respect to this 
sequence. Therefore the alternation behavior could reflect more than 
just the ability to learn to turn left or right but also the ability to 
remember a particular sequence of alternations. Thus the alternation 
error might reflect more than a simple loss in the ability to alternate
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Figure 5. The door error maze ( DEM ). Only one arm of 
the apparatus is open at any one time ( S = Start ; X = Food ).
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and lesions which interfere with the execution of the III maze alter­
nation behaviors may not affect the ability to perform a simple alter­
nation problem. If the ability to execute successful III maze alter­
nation behaviors is dependent upon more than just the ability to learn
to alternate but also involves the ability to learn a sequence of
alternations then alternation behaviors in the III maze may not be 
related to alternation behaviors as measured in a conventional T-maze 
(Figure 6).
General activity level as well as habituation to a novel 
situation could also be related to maze mastery ability. Repeated ex­
posures to an initially novel environment in which activity could be 
assessed would contribute information concerning both activity and 
habituation. A comparison of initial activity level, activity habit­
uation and maze performance could aid in an understanding of the maze 
behaviors.
The present study was undertaken to replicate and extend the 
findings of the first study by including (1) in addition to the three 
cortical groups, two additional groups with damage to either the septum 
or dorsolateral hippocampus and (2) a series of behavioral tasks other 
than the acquisition of the III maze habit. The acquisition of the III 
maze habit was measured by door and alternation errors and trial 
latency.
To further aid in the interpretation of the analysis of the 
acquisition of the III maze habit, several additional behavioral mea­
sures were taken. An additional measure of door error tendency was 
measured by the use of a "door error maze" which presumably does not
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Figure 6. The alternation error maze ( AEM ).
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have an alternation error component (Figure 5). A T-maze, presumably 
without a door error component, was also used to further aid in the 
interpretation of the alternation error behavior (Figure 6). Latency 
in a straight runway, with food reward, was also obtained to aid in 
interpreting possible motivational, motor, or other effects. Extinction 
training was given in the straight runway in an attempt to assess such 
factors as response perseveration and/or failures of inhibition. Spon­
taneous activity was measured for three ten-minute sessions (one session 
per day for three consecutive days) following the completion of all 
maze testing.
Method
Subjects. The ^s in this study were fifty-six male Sprague- 
Dawley rats approximately 200 days old at the initiation of testing. 
There were seven groups of eight ^s each. In addition to the three 
cortical groups employed in the first experiment the present study also 
included four additional groups. These were a group with septal de­
struction (SEP), damage to the dorsolateral hippocampus (DLH), a surgi­
cal control group (SON) and a group of unoperated controls (CN).
Surgery. All surgery was performed in one session while the 
animal was anesthetized with sodium pentobarbital and positioned in a 
Kopf stereotaxic apparatus. Cortical destruction was achieved by the 
same procedure as in Experiment I and the same coordinates were em­
ployed. Bilateral septal and hippocampal lesions were accomplished 
with a Grass Model 2 Radio Frequency Lesioner. The subcortical lesion 
electrodes were unipolar and constructed from insulated Nichrome wire 
(diameter = 0.0159 inches), exposed at the tip for 0.5 to 0.75 mm.
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The stereotaxic coordinates (Pellegrino and Cushman, 1967) for the SEP 
lesions were: antero— posterior plane = + 8.0, lateral plane = + 0.5, 
and vertical plane = + 1.3; coordinates for the DLH lesions were: 
antero— posterior plane = + 1.8, lateral plane = + 4.0, and vertical 
plane = + 0.5. The SON were subjected to the same surgical procedures 
as the MG group except that the dura was not punctured and no cortex 
was removed. All _Ss were given ten days for surgical recovery prior to 
the initiation of test procedures.
Deprivation and handling. All deprivation and handling pro­
cedures were identical to those employed in Experiment I.
Order of testing. On the 11th day of deprivation, once 75- 
80% body weights had been reached, the following order of testing was 
begun for each (1) one ten-minute period of activity recording each 
day for four consecutive days; (2) twenty-one days of acquisition on 
the Lashley III with one trial per day; (3) six days of acquisition on 
the door error maze with two trials per day; (4) six days of acquisi­
tion on the T-maze with two trials per day; (5) six days of acquisition 
in the straight runway with two trials per day; (6) six days of extinc­
tion in the straight runway; and (7) a final four day period of activity 
assessment with one ten-minute period per day for four days. Due to 
each _S being run within the same 15 minute interval each day, in an 
attempt to control for possible circadian effects, no test session can 
require more than two trials per day.
Apparatus and procedures. The III maze used in this study 
was the same as that employed in Experiment I. In addition to door and 
alternation errors, row and trial latencies were also included as
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dependent variables. A switch, depressed by the E's left hand, started 
a timer when the E raised the start-box door thus allowing the _S access 
to row one; another switch, also operated by the E's left hand, was 
depressed thus stopping the timer, activated earlier, whenever the ^ 
entered the goal-box. The elapsed time was defined as trial latency.
The switch which the E depressed to signify each row entry also acti­
vated a print-out counter which printed the total cumulative elapsed 
time prior to that print signal. Subtracting the first print-out from 
the second print-out gave the time spent (latency) in row one. All row 
latencies could thus be calculated by a simple subtraction of the 
different cumulative latencies. Admittedly this technique of latency 
assessment includes an element of the E's own reaction times but the 
latencies in question are usually quite large, several seconds at least, 
and therefore any appreciable treatment effects should be detected by 
this technique.
The activity measuring device used in this study was also the 
same as that employed in Experiment I, but the activity phase of this 
study was extended to four consecutive days. Both the maze and activity 
handling and testing procedures were identical to those employed in 
Experiment I.
The door error maze (Figure 5) consisted of a five-foot 
straight runway, four inches wide, with a goal-box one foot from the 
end on either of the two alley walls. The dimensions of the goal-box 
were: door width - four inches; length - eighteen inches; and width -
four inches. One-half of the ^s in each group had the goal box on one 
side and the other ^s in each group had the goal-box on the opposite side.
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The dependent variables were latency per trial and door errors. 
Latency per trial was the time elapsed between the ^ leaving the start- 
box and entering the goal-box. A door error consisted of the ^ going 
past the door (opening) to the goal-box.
The alternation error maze was a conventional T-maze (Figure 
6). The length of the alley from start-box to choice point was four 
feet. The start-box section was one foot in length. The T-arms extended 
eighteen inches from either side of the start-box alley at right angles 
to the alley. The internal width of the alley and T-arms was four 
inches.
The dependent variables were latency per trial and alter­
nation errors. Latency per trial was the time elapsed between the ^'s
leaving the start-box and entering the arm of the T which contained the 
food. The alternation error consisted of the _S turning in the direc­
tion opposite the goal-box at the choice point. The arm of the T that
contained the food was opposite from the side of the door error maze
that contained the goal-box for each Thus if a S found food on the
left (reference to the start-box) side of the door error maze, then for 
that S the right side of the T-maze was the goal-box. Each ^ was 
allowed to find the goal-box even if an alternation error was made.
The straight runway was an alley six and one-half feet long
and four inches wide, with one foot of one end being a start-box and
eighteen inches of the other end being the goal-box. When the start- 
box was opened the ^ was simply required to go to the food. Latency 
from start-box to goal-box was the dependent variable.
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Results
The data from this study which consisted of the III maze, door 
and alternation error behaviors, and day one of the activity testing 
phase, of the three cortical groups was considered to be a replication 
of the first experiment as surgery, testing procedures and other general 
factors were basically the same for both studies. Therefore the data 
from both experiments were pooled for some analyses dealing exclusively 
with cortical lesions. All other analyses dealt with the data from 
Experiment II.
The number of ^s in the analyses which pooled the cortically 
lesioned ^s in Experiments I and II were thirty-nine (N = 13 per group). 
In Experiment I the number of _Ss in each group which survived until the 
completion of maze training was six, six and five for the AC, MC and PC 
groups respectively. The number of Ss in each of the respective groups 
which completed maze training in Experiment II were seven, eight and 
eight. One ^ was randomly selected from the MC group and discarded.
This allowed for greater ease of statistical analyses as the available 
computerized analyses of variance programs required an equal number of 
observations per cell and discarding one S from the MC group resulted 
in thirteen ^s being in each of the cortical groups. In the analysis 
of the III maze data for Experiment II the number of Ss in each of the 
six groups was seven. One ^ in two of the groups died prior to the 
completion of training on the III maze and for ease of computations one 
^ was randomly discarded from each of the other groups.
For all analyses of variance both the door and alternation 
errors and latencies were transformed according to Kirk (1968). For
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door errors, where the variances were highly correlated with the means, 
the transformation was = log (x + 1.0) and for alternation errors, 
where there were many scores of zero and one, the transformation was 
= X + 0.5. Latencies were transformed to the logarithm of each value 
to reduce some of the positive skew associated with such data.
Ill Maze
Cortical effects. Only thirty-four of the thirty-nine corti­
cally lesioned brains were available for an estimate of amount of 
cortical damage (topographical area) as three subjects died prior to 
the completion of all testing, and these brains were not saved for his­
tological examination, and two other brains were inadvertently micro- 
tomed and partially destroyed before an estimate of cortical damage 
could be made.
Of the thirty-four brains, ten were in the AC group and 
twelve were in the MC and twelve in the PC groups. The mean amount of 
cortical destruction for the AC, MC and PC groups was 22.4%, 22.5% and 
22.0% respectively (Appendix A). Neither a t-test between means nor a 
Mann-Whitney U test of ranks indicated a significant difference between 
any of the groups in terms of amount of cortical damage.
An examination of these brains confirmed the finding of the 
first study that amount of cortical damage (mass) was not significantly 
correlated with either error. Across groups, the correlations between 
amount of cortical damage (%) and errors were R = + 0.174 and R =
+ 0.141 for door and alternation errors respectively. Within groups, 
the same correlations were equally as low ranging from an R of + 0.164 
between amount of destruction and door errors in the AC group to an
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R of - 0.07 between amount of destruction and alternation errors in the 
MC group. Although the range of amount of cortical destruction is not 
very great, varying for 10.3% to 33.9%, higher correlations than those 
observed should have been obtained if the relationship between brain 
damage and maze behavior is governed by "mass action".
Other investigators (Saavedra, Pinto-Hamuy & Oberti, 1965) 
have also reported findings which were inconsistent with the general 
concept of mass action. While lesions to the anterior (frontomotor) 
and middle (somatosensory) cortical areas did produce behavioral defi­
cits which correlated with lesion size, lesions to the visual (poster­
ior) and auditory (lateral middle and posterior sites) failed to result 
in behavioral loss which was related to size of lesion.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 demonstrate that mass is not the critical 
factor in determining maze behavior in terms of door errors. While all 
three ^s had comparable lesions, in fact the AC and PC lesions were 
larger than the MC lesion, and performed comparably in terms of alter­
nation errors, the MC lesioned ^ made many more door errors than the 
other two ^s.
Door error analysis— cortical groups. A Kruskal-Wallis one­
way analysis of variance performed on ..otal door errors for the pooled 
cortical groups indicated a significant difference between groups (H = 
9.819, df = 2, p < .01). It can be seen in Figure 10 that the MC group 
displayed more door errors than the other two groups. Both the AC and 
PC groups differed significantly from the MC group (AC--MC, t = 1.95, 
p ^  .05; PC— MC, t = 1.97, p ^  .05) but failed to differ significantly 
from each other (t = 0.226). A four factor analysis of variance (Winer,
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Figure 7. An example of on AC subject.  The th ree  
n u m bers ,  from left to right, refer to ( 1 ) S #, ( 2 ) total door 
errors  and ( 3 ) total alternat ion  errors  for that S.
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Figure 8. An example of a MC subject .
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Figure 10. Mean door errors os a function of site of 
cortical damage.
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1962, p. 328) was performed on these data also revealing a significant 
between groups effect (Table 2). The factors in this analysis were
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DOOR 
ERRORS FOR COMBINED CORTICAL GROUPS 
OF EXPERIMENT I AND II
Source df^ MS F
Between subjects 38 b
G (groups) 2 5.373 3.913
Subj w. groups 36 1.344
Within subjects 2301
T (trials) 9 (1) 5.243 39.174 ?
GT 18 (2) 0.465 3.481 G
T X subj w. groups 324 (36) 0.133
R (row) 5 (1) 2.315 15.952 c
GR 10 (2) 0.167 1.154
R X subj w. groups 180 (36) 0.141
TR 45 (2) 0.073
GTR 90 (2) 0.074
TR X subj w. groups 1620 (36) 0.074
^  conservative test df
^ p < . 0 5
p <..01
groups (three— AC, MC and PC), trials (ten— the twenty acquisition 
trials were collapsed into ten blocks of two trials each), rows (the 
six rows of the maze) and replications (the thirteen Ss in each group). 
This analysis also revealed a significant trials effect, row effect and 
groups by trials interaction. The Greenhouse and Geisser procedure of
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using conservative degrees of freedom in calculating F ratios for multi­
factor experiments having repeated measures (Winer, 1962, p. 305-306) 
was used in calculating all F values reported in this study.
The row effect for door errors can be seen in Figure 11 and
shows a typical goal-gradient effect. That is, the row furtherest from
the goal-box (row one) shows a higher frequency of errors than does that
row nearest to the goal (row six).
The trials effect (Figure 12) shows that although there was 
much initial difficulty in executing the door behaviors on the first 
few trials, this difficulty had greatly decreased by the last few trials. 
Thus the door error showed a steady decrease across trials.
The groups by trials interaction for door errors can be seen 
in Figure 13 which shows that while the AC and PC ^s had overcome by 
trialblock four the sudden difficulty experienced in trialblock two, 
the MC group did not overcome this difficulty until trialblock six.
Alternation error analysis--cortical groups. A Kruskal- 
Wallis one-way analysis of variance performed on the total alternation 
errors for the pooled cortical groups failed to indicate a significant 
difference between groups. A four factor analysis of variance of the 
transformed data (Table 3) revealed significant trial and row effects.
The trials effect (Figure 14) is interesting in that while there was 
improvement across trials for all groups, this improvement was slight. 
Thus while being significant this improvement may not have been appreci­
able.
The row effect (Figure 15) was due to the extreme difficulty 
afforded by rows one, furtherest from the goal, and row six, the nearest
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Figure 13, The groups by trials interaction
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Figure 15. Mean alternation errors per row.
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to the goal. Thus while the door error shows a goal-gradient effect, 
this is not the case for the alternation error.
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ALTERNATION 
ERRORS FOR COMBINED CORTICAL GROUPS 
OF EXPERIMENT I AND II









9 (1) 4.542 39.496 *
GT 18 (2) 0.218 1.896
T X subj w. groups 324 (36) 0.115
R 5 (1) 2.014 10.070 *
GR 10 (2) 0.571 2.855
R X subj w. groups 180 (36) 0.200
TR 45 (2) 0.104 1.0
GTR 90 (2) 0.113 1.0
TR X subj w. groups 1620 (36) 0.139
^ P <  .01
Cortical, subcortical and normal behaviors. Figures 16, 17
and 18 show an example of SEP, DLH and SON brains. The SEP lesions 
(Figure 16) were extensive, destroying most of the medial and lateral 
septum. The DLH lesions (Figure 17) produced little damage to non- 
hippocampal structures and were restricted to the DLH. An example of 
a SON brain (Figure 18) is shown to demonstrate the herniation of these 
brains due to the brain tissue filling the cavity left from the skull
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Figure 16. An example of a SEP lesion.
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m
Figure 17. An example of a DLH lesion.
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Figure 18. An example of a SCN brain.
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removal.
Door error analysis--all groups. A Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance of the total door errors for each of the seven 
groups (AC, MC, PC, SEP, DLH, SCN and CN) Indicated a significant dif­
ference between groups (H = 18.88, df = 6, p ^  .01). A four factor 
analysis of variance (groups x trials x rows x replications) revealed 
significant group, trial and row effects (Table 4).
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DOOR ERRORS 
IN III MAZE FOR ALL GROUPS
Source df MS F
Between subjects 48
G 6 4.177 3.674 a
Subj w. groups 42 1.137
Within subjects 2891
T 9 (1) 6.060 56.635 a
GT 54 (6) 0.219 2.046
T X subj w. groups 378 (42) 0.107
R 5 (1) 2.795 18.149 *
GR 30 (6) 0.126 0.818
R X subj w. groups 210 (42) 0.154
TR 45 (6) 0.109 1.579
GTR 270 (6) 0.073 1.058
TR X subj w. groups 1890 (42) 0.069
^ p <  .01
The groups effect for door errors can be seen In Figure 19. 
Every group, except the PC Ss, differed significantly from the CN group 

















Figure 19. Mean door errors per group.
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The other significant differences were between the MC ^s and the DLH ^s 
and the MC group and the SCN.
TABLE 5
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF TOTAL DOOR 
ERRORS FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN .05* .001 * .01 .002 .05
AC * * * * *
MC * * .04 .01




* All values represent two-tailed probabilities
The row and trials effects are not shown as they are virtual 
replicas of the same effects seen in Figures 11 and 12.
Alternation error analysis--all groups. A Kruskal-Wallis one­
way analysis of variance of the total alternation errors for the seven 
groups revealed a significant difference between groups (H = 20.97, 
df = 6, p ^  .01). A four factor analysis of variance (groups x trials 
X rows X replications) indicated significant group, trial and row 
effects (Table 6). The group effect can be seen in Figure 20. Table 7 
gives the Mann-Whitney U comparisons between the various groups and 
shows that every group except the SCN differs significantly from the CN. 
The MC group also differs significantly from the AC, SEP and SCN groups. 
There was also a significant difference between DLH and SEP lesioned
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ALTERNATION 
ERRORS IN III MAZE FOR ALL GROUPS
Source df MS F
Between subjects 48
G 6 5.599 6.813 *
Subj w. groups 42 0.838
Within subjects 2891
T 9 (1) 4.580 28.095 &
GT 54 (6) 0.268 1.641
T X subj w. groups 378 (42) 0.163
R 5 (1) 3.047 10.470*
GR 30 (6) 0.400 1.374
R X subj w. groups 210 (42) 0.291
TR 45 (6) 0.139 1.311
GTR 270 (6) 0.092 0.867
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Figure 20. Mean alternation errors per group.
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Ss as well as significant differences between the two control groups.
TABLE 7
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF TOTAL ALTERNATION 
ERRORS FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN .006 .002 .014 .01 .002 *
AC .054 * * * *
MC * .018 * .014
PC * * *
SEP .028 *
DLH .038
The row effect (not shown) was very similar to that seen for 
the cortical groups. That is, rows one and six were the most difficult 
rows for the alternation error, across groups. The trials effect, also 
not shown indicated a moderate improvement across trials.
Latency analysis— all groups. A four factor analysis of 
variance of the trial latencies failed to indicate a significant dif­
ference between groups but did show significant trial and row effects 
(Table 8). The trials effect, not shown, was due to a marked, steady 
improvement across trials. The row effect can be seen in Figure 21 
and is interesting in that while row six is a difficult row with respect 
to the alternation error, latencies in this row were the shortest of 
any.
Door Error Maze (DEM)
Table 9 gives the results of the between group comparisons of 
the total errors on the DEM. These results closely parallel those seen
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF III MAZE 
LATENCIES FOR ALL GROUPS
Source df MS F
Between subjects 48
G 6 9.903 1.488
Subj w. groups 42 6.656
Within subjects 2891
T 9 (1) 32.536 92.063 b
GT 54 (6) 0.305 0.863
T X subj w. groups 378 (42) 0.353
R 5 (1) 1.076 5.020 *
GR 30 (6) 0.230 1.072
R X subj w. groups 210 (42) 0.214
TR 45 (6) 0.115 1.477
GTR 270 (6) 0.082 1.057
TR X subj w. groups 1890 (42) 0.078
a p <.05
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Figure 21. Mean latency per row.
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in Table 5 for door errors on the III maze. The performance of the 
various groups on the DEM can be seen in Figure 22. With the exception 
of the DLH lesioned ^s all groups differ significantly from the CN.
The MC group differs significantly from the AC group, the DLH group and 
both control groups.
TABLE 9
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF TOTAL ERRORS ON THE 
DOOR ERROR MAZE (DEM) FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN .06 .001 .02 .02 * .01
AC .04 * * * *
MC * * .06 .04
PC * * *
SEP * *
DLH *
A comparison of the various groups in terms of trial laten­
cies (Figure 23) revealed that the SEP lesioned ^s had significantly 
lower latencies than the AC, MC and PC groups and the SCN (Table 10),
Alternation Error Maze (AEM)
There were no significant differences between groups as mea­
sured either by errors (Figure 24) or trial latencies on this apparatus.
Straight Alley Maze (SAM)
There were no significant differences between groups in terms 
of trial latencies during the acquisition phase.
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Figure 22. Mean door errors per group.
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Figure 25. Mean straight alley runway extinction latency per group
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for the extinction phase of the SAM testing. Mann-Whitney U comparisons 
of the groups in terms of extinction latencies revealed no significant 
differences.
TABLE 10
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF TOTAL 
LATENCIES ON DEM FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN * * * * *
AC * .032 * *
MC .004 * *
PC .007 * *
SEP * .017
DLH
A comparison of the mean for trials nine plus ten for acqui­
sition minus the mean of trials nine plus ten during extinction 
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test; Siegel, 1956) indicated that 
all groups did show significant extinction. The AC and SEP groups did 
not have enough ^s in each group for an adequate statistical analysis 
of this data (N = 5 per group) but they appeared to show appreciable 
extinction.
Activity
Cortical effects. A comparison of the group means of the 
activity scores (total photocell interruptions) which combined the ^'s 
activity scores in Experiment I with the cortically lesioned ^s activity 
score for day one of Experiment II indicated that the MC group was sig­
nificantly more active than the AC (t=+2.32, df = 20, p ̂  .05) but not
81
the PC group (t. = + 1.63, df = 22, NS) . There was also no significant 
activity differences between the AC and PC groups (t = - 0.97, df = 20, 
NS).
The percentage of cortex removed also failed to show a sig­
nificant correlation with activity across groups (34 cases, R = 0.172). 
There were also no significant correlations between amount of cortical 
destruction and activity within any of the three cortical groups (AC,
R = + .224; MC, R = + .532; PC, R = - .170). The number of cases in 
each group were ten, twelve and twelve respectively.
The correlation between activity and door errors, across 
groups (34 cases), was significant (R = + .458, p ^  .01) but this was 
not the case for the alternation error (R = + .267). There were no 
significant correlations between activity and either error within any 
cortical group.
The activity phase of Experiment II can be seen in Figure 26 
which shows the three days activity scores for each of the seven groups. 
On day one (Table 11) the CN group was significantly less active than 
every group except the AC and the SCN groups. The AC group was signifi­
cantly less active than the MC, the SEP and the DLH groups. The MC 
group was significantly more active than the SCN group. The PC group 
was significantly less active than the SEP group. Both the SEP and DLH 
groups were significantly more active than the SCN group. There was 
a tendency for the subcortically lesioned Ss to be more active than the 
other groups followed by the cortically lesioned and control ^s in 
that order.
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Figure 26. Mean activity score per group for the three activity se ss io n s
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TABLE 11
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF DAY ONE
ACTIVITY SCORES FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN * .000 .05 .002 .000 *
AC .006 * .008 .002 *
MC * * * .002
PC .008 .038 *
SEP * .006
DLH .000
By day two (Table 12) the main differences were between the 
subcortically lesioned ^s (SEP and DLH ^s) and the other groups with 
the subcortically lesioned ^s being the most active.
TABLE 12
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF DAY TWO 
ACTIVITY SCORES FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN * .028 * .000 .002 *
AC .030 * .008 .006 *
MC * .02 * *
PC .008 * *
SEP .01 .002
DLH .02
On day three (Table 13) the CN group was significantly less
active than all groups except the AC and SCN groups . The AC group was
also significantly less active than the other cortical or subcortical
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groups. The MC group was significantly more active than the CN, AC and 
SCN groups but was significantly less active than the SEP group. The 
PC group was significantly more active than the CN and AG groups but 
was significantly less active than the SEP group. The SEP ^s were sig­
nificantly more active than all other groups. The DLH ^s were signifi­
cantly more active than the CN, AC and SCN groups but were significantly 
less active than the SEP group. The SCN group was significantly less 
active than the MC, SEP and DLH groups. On day three, as on day one, 
the order of activity, from most to least active, was roughly subcorti- 
cal groups first, cortical groups second and control groups were the 
least active.
TABLE 13
MANN-WHITNEY U COMPARISONS OF DAY THREE 
ACTIVITY SCORES FOR ALL GROUPS
AC MC PC SEP DLH SCN
CN J- .004 .01 .000 .000 *
AC .01 .004 .004 .002 *
MC I'c .008 * .028





The finding that the MC group made significantly more door
errors than either of the other two cortical groups suggests that the
rat neocortex is not equipotential with respect to maze mastery. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by the finding that there were no 
significant differences between the groups in terms of amount of cortex 
destroyed. Thus the principle of "mass action" cannot explain the 
differences in performance between the lesion groups.
The finding that all three cortically lesioned groups per­
formed nearly identically with respect to the alternation error would
suggest that the rat neocortex is equipotential with respect to maze 
mastery. The finding that there were no significant differences between 
the groups in terms of amount of cortex destroyed would simply strengthen 
this conclusion as the law of mass action would also appear to be 
satisfied.
Thus one finding of this study was that while a given neural 
mass may be equipotential with respect to some behaviors that same 
neural mass may not be equipotential with respect to another set of 
behaviors. The apparent inconsistency of this statement is underscored 
by the fact that it is based upon observations of the same individuals
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following a single nervous system lesion.
Any inconsistency in the above statement cannot be due to 
simple inaccuracies of lesion measurement because the two behaviors 
being measured were in the same individuals at approximately the same 
time and therefore size of lesion was controlled. If the increase in 
door errors in the MC group was due to a greater amount of mass being 
removed (but inaccurately measured) why was there not a corresponding 
increase in alternation errors in that group?
These findings suggest the possibility of a site by behavior 
interaction as far as a deficit in learning the III maze habit is con­
cerned. That is, the effect of a lesion is dependent upon the cortical 
region destroyed and the behavior under study. Furthermore, since 
there was no significant; correlation between alterations of these behav­
iors and amount of brain damage, the concept of mass action is also 
challenged. Finally, the percentage of cortex removed failed to relate 
to other behaviors such as general activity.
These findings would suggest that some caution should be exer­
cised when proposing "equipotentiality" tempered with "mass action" as 
determinants of neurobehavioral relationships. As important as these 
concepts are, they must be considered in terms of particular behaviors. 
That is, behavioral definition is as important as neuroanatomical 
specification when attempting to state neurobehavioral relationships.
The finding that both III maze errors were significantly 
elevated in nearly all surgical groups indicates that these behaviors 
are affected by brain damage. Only the PC group failed to show a sig­
nificant departure from control values for door errors (even this was
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significant for one-tailed comparisons) while only the SCN group failed 
to significantly differ from the CN group in terms of alternation errors. 
Here it should be noted that the SCN should not be considered to be non­
brain-damaged. That is to say, their brains were not normal, having 
filled the cavity created by the skull removal (Figure 18). While the 
complete effects of this situation are not known it would not be sur­
prising to find that these ^s differed significantly from controls in 
several behaviors.
Although the differences between cortical groups in terms of 
door errors was significant when the ^s for Experiments I and II were 
combined, this was not the case for either set of data analyzed sepa­
rately. Since there were no significant differences between the groups 
for either error measure the two groups were considered to be statis­
tically from the same population. The significant effect observed from 
pooling the groups indicates that this was a trend of the population 
that was not easily detected in small samples. Therefore it is not 
surprising to find no significant differences between cortical groups 
for door errors in the analysis of the data from Experiment II (Table 
5). It was surprising to find that the SCN group and the DLH lesioned 
^s differed significantly from the MC group in terms of door errors. 
Apparently the swelling of the brain into the bone cavity in the same 
area as the MC lesions did not produce effects similar to the lesion.
The seven group, alternation error, analysis for the III maze 
found that all brain-damage groups differed significantly from the CN 
group. This indicates that the alternation error is also affected by 
brain damage. It was surprising to find that this error was so highly
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elevated in the DLH lesioned _Ss which differed significantly from the 
CN and the SEP group. The MC group also made significantly more alter­
nation errors than the SEP group or the SCN group. Thus it appears that 
the alternation error is more sensitive to a variety of lesions than is 
the door error which is expressed mainly in terms of cortical effects.
The trial latencies for the III maze failed to uncover any 
specific lesion groups with deviant latencies. However the finding that 
the lowest latencies were made in row six and that this row also had 
the greatest number of alternation errors would indicate that the alter­
nation error is not due to a simple slowing of behaviors.
The door error maze (DEM) analysis indicated that it too could 
detect brain damage in a manner highly similar to the III maze. With 
few exceptions Table 5 and Table 8 appear to be almost identical. The 
tasks themselves would appear to have basic similarities. The III maze 
door task can be reduced roughly to "going through an 'opening' in a 
wall". For the DEM the task is more like "going down a 'hall' every 
time you come to one". The latency analysis for the DEM indicated that 
the SEP group was the fastest in spite of the fact that they were not 
the best performers in terms of errors (Table 9). This type of error 
may also be somewhat independent of latency.
The finding that the alternation error maze (AEM) failed to 
distinguish between groups would indicate that the AEM may not ade­
quately reflect the "alternation error" component of the III maze. The 
alternation component of the III maze is probably determined by the 
sequencing of alternatives while the AEM used in this study required 
only that the ^ learned to turn in a particular direction and required
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no sequence of turns.
The failure to find any significant differences between groups 
in terms of either the straight alley maze (SAM) acquisition or extinc­
tion behaviors would suggest that the brain-damage related behaviors 
seen in this study were not due to unusual motivational or motoric 
factors. The extinction behaviors of all groups would also argue against 
a simple "response perseveration" hypothesis to explain the results of 
certain lesions. Thus there appear to be no basic failures of either 
"maze excitation" or "maze inhibition" in any of the experimental 
groups. If elevations in either error behavior for the III maze had 
been due to a simple lack of either general motor facilitation or inhi­
bition this deficit was not seen in the studies dealing with straight 
runway acquisition or extinction.
The findings that the cortical groups which made the most 
door errors was also the most active and that there was a significant 
correlation between door errors and activity across groups suggest that 
activity is an important dimension of the door error behavior. This 
does not seem to be the case for the alternation error as the correla­
tion between these behaviors and activity were nonsignificant. The 
activity phase of Experiment II found that large changes in activity 
were produced by both cortical and subcortical lesions. The groups that 
were the most active (Figure 26) were also the ones which made more 
door errors (Figure 19).
The two primary behaviors under study, door and alternation 
errors in the III maze, while having some apparent face validity in 
terms of their distinctions, are not completely understood in terms of
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their respective behavioral significance. Although the two behaviors 
were significantly correlated with each other this correlation was less 
than perfect (R = + .473, p .01) and the two behaviors were affected 
differently by the various lesions. Furthermore the dynamics of the 
two behaviors are distinguishable in the maze. The door error shows a 
goal-gradient across rows with the row furtherest from the goal (row 
one) showing the most errors and the row nearest the goal (row six) 
being the least difficult. This was not the case for the alternation 
error as row six was one of the most difficult rows for this behzvior. 
The two behaviors also differed with respect to their level of recovery 
following brain damage. The door error, although being strongly exag­
gerated by the cortical lesions, had recovered to a near normal level 
by trial twelve (Figure 12) but the alternation error showed only 
slight recovery by trial twenty (Figure 14).
The failure of the AEM to detect any group differences while 
the alternation error behavior in the III maze did (Table 7) would 
indicate that the alternation error in the III maze is not analogous to 
a simple T-maze alternation task. However, the door error behavior 
does appear to be related to whatever is measured in the DEM and in 
that respect may not be as dependent upon the structure of the III maze 
for its occurrence as is the alternation error.
Ill Maze Behaviors 
Door Errors
Observations of brain-damaged and normal ^s in the III maze 
gives one the impression that the rat which makes a large number of
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door errors is one which has become disoriented in the maze. That is, 
quite often that S will explore the wall of the row which does not have 
an opening (the door is shut once the ^ enters a row) and will not 
attend to the wall of the row with the door opening into the next row. 
This behavior can persist for many minutes in one or several rows. Then 
suddenly the ^ will enter the door into the next row, and may or may 
not repeat the performance of the preceeding row.
Failure to go through a door is not due to a sensory deficit 
alone as the rat will often orient toward a door, momentarily, and then 
pass up the opportunity to enter by turning 180° and examining the 
other wall of the row. Quite often the ^ will actually peer into the 
opening but refuse to enter. This behavior is especially exasperating 
to Es. A normal ^ may occasionally refuse to enter a door and continue 
to explore the row but this behavior is usually abandoned after very 
few trials. However the normal ^ seldom exhibits the severe disorien­
tation which is easily inferred from observations of the brain-damaged 
S.
Alternation Errors
The alternation error is difficult to analyze in terms of 
either related activities or normal and brain-damaged behaviors. The 
alternation error is usually committed with less loss of time than is 
the door error, especially in the case of exaggerated door errors and 
is quite often committed several times in a trial which has a shorter 
total latency than an earlier trial on which no errors were committed. 
This error simply consists of turning into the blind cul-de-sac immedi­
ately upon entering a row. As the direction of the correct turn varies
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from row to row (r 1 r 1 r 1) the efficient (no error) execution of 
this behavior requires some type of sequencing mechanism. This could 
very likely be accomplished by utilizing extra-maze cues although other 
cues, such as just having turned left (or right), could be utilized. 
Very possibly the "alternation" behaviors in the III maze involve a 
more complex interaction between extra-maze, intra-maze and organismic 
variables than do the "door" behaviors which involve the simpler task 
of only going forward through the available openings.
A unique feature of the alternation error is that it is 
always committed prior to a door error. That is, the only opportunity 
to execute an alternation error is removed once the ^ turns in the 
correct direction for that row; door errors are committed at some later 
point in time. The execution of an alternation error could disorient 
some brain-damaged Ss and contribute to their door error behavior. If 
the probability of a door error is higher following the execution (and 
resulting confusion) of an alternation error, this could explain the 
significant correlation between the two errors, in the cortically 
damaged ^s. That these behaviors were not significantly correlated in 
the CN group (R = + .304, N = 8) would be consistent with this expla­
nation. However these behaviors were also significantly correlated 
(R = + .858, N = 8, p ^  .05) in the DLH group which was low in door 
errors but high in alternation error behaviors.
The Maze Habit
The importance of the door and alternation errors may not be 
in some intrinsic property of either but in the fact they demonstrate
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that the term "maze habit" may not be a sufficiently detailed descrip­
tion of maze behaviors. The successful maze habit may consist of more 
meaningful subdivisions than just the door and alternation error behav­
iors. Highly informative behavioral analyses may focus on some yet 
undefined behavioral complex. The door and alternation errors can be 
conceived of as one type of deviation about the true path. That is if 
an animal alternates incorrectly and runs past the door into a cul, it 
has left the extreme boundaries of the true path and has committed one 
alternation and one door error. The ^ can still fail to enter the next 
row by leaving the cul and moving back out into the middle of the row, 
thereby executing a second door efror which may reflect a different 
behavioral substrate from the first door error as the ^ is back on the 
true path, only reversed. A yet unexamined class of behaviors could be 
deviations (failures of orientation) within the true path, such as 
turning 180° and reversing directions within a row. This could happen 
after entering the row but prior to encountering the next door and in 
other situations. *
There are many examples of behavior which can be studied in 
the III maze. The choice of any is somewhat arbitrary. The approach 
employed here was to analyze the behavioral demands of the test situa­
tion. These demands are determined by the physical environment and in 
the case of the III maze vary from moment to moment depending upon the 
^s position in the maze. The problem is one of trying to fractionize 
these behaviors into meaningful units. Some behaviors, such as tail 
twitching, are probably non-related to maze mastery while other behav­
iors, such as going through a door at every opportunity, and turning
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left or right in the proper sequence once having entered a door, are 
obviously intimately involved in the "maze habit". Thus the maze habit 
can be considered to consist of at least two "units" of behavior which 
can be defined in terms of the various behavioral demands of the test 
situation. An examination of the response requirements for the two 
errors reveals that one, the alternation error, may require a temporal 
sequencing ability that is not seen in the door error. The organiza­
tion required of the alternation behaviors would hardly appear to be 
the same as that seen in door behaviors which do not involve the same 
level of response sequencing.
Perhaps one dimension along which behaviors may be evaluated 
is in terms of "temporal" as opposed to "spatial" environmental demands 
which occasion the behaviors. Behaviors which have a temporal nature 
may represent a more highly organized set of behaviors than those behav­
iors which are expressed in terms of immediate, more spatial, environ­
mental demands (such as door entry). Behavior was viewed as expressing 
varying degrees of such organization by the founder of the Behavioristic 
movement— John B. Watson. Describing behavior in terms of the "stimulus 
and response" model, Watson stated
By response we mean anything the animal does—  
such as turning toward or away from a light, jumping 
at a sound, and more highly organized activities such 
as building a skyscraper, drawing plans, having babies, 
writing books, and the like. (Watson, 1963, p. 6).
Thus even Watson implied a type of behavioral organization 
which is amenable to a spatio-temporal analysis. Some behaviors deal 
with immediate physical environmental demands while others incorporate 
a level of organization that is not expressed in any one response
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execution. Other investigators have also proposed an analysis of 
behavior in terms similar to this.
In summary, then, a working distinction can 
apparently be made between two types of behavioral 
process. One type occurs in response to simple 
repetitions of events. The other takes place when 
the temporal patterns of redundancy with which 
events occur are more complex. (Pribram, Lim, Poppen 
& Bagshaw, 1966).
The behavioral analysis of the III maze may afford new 
insights into neurobehavioral relationships. For instance, is there a 
point of behavioral fractionation beyond which no reasonable neurobehav­
ioral relationship can be established? This question can only be 
answered by future research. The present data do indicate, however, 
that all components of the "maze habit" may not be equally affected by 
brain lesions.
A Neurobehavioral Analysis
Any proposed neural model, based on III maze behaviors, must 
take into account the inconsistencies between brain lesions and behav­
iors, in terms of equipotentiality, seen in this study. There is prob­
ably no clear division between the various boundaries, neurologically, 
as lesions in both the anterior and posterior zones would occasionally 
inflate the door error score while some lesions covering most of the 
middle zone failed to produce an increase in door errors. Thus the 
localization of the door error would not appear to be a precise, static 
type of neurobehavioral arrangement but instead a more "dynamic" or 
"graded" localization similar to that proposed by Luria (1966).
Perhaps a neural model which incorporates both the remarkable 
equipotentiality of the alternation error and the elusive localization
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of the door error for the same neural mass is not presently available. 
This may not be due as much to failings of neuroanatomical sophistica­
tion as to the tendency to view behavior as a unitary concept rather 
than as a behavioral complex. The term "behavioral complex" will refer 
to a behavior state which includes two or more behaviors in its expres­
sion. The term "simple(r) behavior" will refer to those behaviors 
which compose the more complex behavior. Thus the successful maze 
"habit" will be designated "complex" when it includes successful "door" 
and "alternation" behaviors. The concept of a "behavioral complex" 
allows for a continual analysis of the components of that complex 
whereas the concept of a "habit", "reflex" or "behavior" implies a 
definiteness that discourages further analysis. This could greatly 
influence neurobehavioral theory (and investigations). Granted the con­
cept of a "behavioral complex", as opposed to a "habit", the argument 
could be made that the more complex the behavior in question (i.e., maze 
mastery as opposed to a righting response), the higher the probability 
that several brain systems contribute to that behavior. Therefore, in 
the absence of an examination of the components of that behavioral pro­
duct, the greater the probability that "equipotentiality" holds for that 
behavior being measured. As the total behavioral picture can be reduced 
to its components then the probability of "specificity" may be increased 
for the various behavior components.
This argument, while being similar to that of Hunter (1930) 
emphasizes the neurobehavioral units rather than the neurosensory com­
ponents of a behavioral complex. Hunter argued that the rat neocortex 
appeared to be equipotential because "...there are many sensory
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projection areas involved in maze control and the lesions do not affect
all of them." (1930, p. 466). The following quotations from Hunter's
1930 article explain his position more fully.
In the maze habit we are not yet wise enough 
to specify what precise stimuli are involved and 
when and where they function in the maze. (p. 495).
The maze act and the learning process are much more 
complicated phenomena than the conclusions of some 
previous investigators would indicate, (p. 461).
...the maze habit is controlled by a multiplicity of 
sensory cues. (p. 464).
If the maze response were controlled by a single 
sensory field, as is the case with brightness dis­
crimination, then one would expect the results on corti­
cal lesions to reveal some fairly definite localization 
of the neural control. If, however, many different
stimuli are essentially equally effective in the control
of the response, then no one cortical lesion should 
destroy the response, and the ability to form and retain 
the habit should be decreased roughly in proportion to 
the amount of cerebral tissue destroyed. As more and 
more cortical projection areas are removed, and the 
total integrative function of the cortex is increas­
ingly hampered. (p. 465).
These formulations obviously represent an era of psychology 
which was still strongly concerned with questions of behavior which 
were expressed in terms of the reflex arc doctrine. Thus "stimuli" and 
"response" were considered to be the principal characters in the expres­
sion of behavior. If, however, emphasis is placed upon the response 
side of the S-R formula for behavior then the statements by Hunter 
(quoted above) might be written as follows:
In the maze habit we are not yet wise enough 
to specify what precise behaviors are involved and 
when and where they function in the maze.
The maze act and the learning process are much more 
complicated phenomena than the conclusions of some
98
previous Investigators would indicate.
...the maze habit is composed of a multiplicity of 
behavioral units.
If the maze habit were controlled by a single 
response, as is the case with brightness discrimina­
tion, then one would expect the results on cortical 
lesions to reveal some fairly definite localization 
of the neural control. If, however, many different 
behaviors are essentially equally effective in the 
control of the habit being measured, then no one corti­
cal lesion should destroy the response, and the ability 
to form and retain the habit should be decreased roughly 
in proportion to the amount of cerebral tissue destroyed.
As more and more tissue is eliminated, more and more 
neurobehavioral units will be removed, and the total 
behavioral integration controlled by that neural mass 
will be increasingly hampered.
Hunter's formulations would lead one to believe all that was 
necessary to demonstrate localization of function within the rat cortex, 
for the III maze habit, was to identify the necessary stimuli which 
occasioned the expression of the habit and look for response failures 
to each stimulus following discrete brain damage to the neural area 
concerned with the reception of that stimulus. Cannot the same logic 
be applied using the concept of a "behavioral" as opposed to a "stimu­
lus" analysis of the III maze habit.
Employing a behavioral analysis of the maze habit much in the 
manner which Hunter advocated a sensory (stimulus) analysis, leads to 
the following conclusions: (a) the more complex a behavior, the greater
the probability it will exhibit an equipotential neurobehavioral rela­
tionship; (b) the simpler behaviors will show a higher degree of locali­
zation; and (c) "mass action" should hold for the more complex behaviors. 
The only conclusion which is challenged by the data from this study is 
the last conclusion (c). Neither door nor alternation errors correlated
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with amount of cortical damage significantly, as a function of location. 
This could be seen in comparisons of door and alternation error behav­
iors in the same animals. The alternation error also failed to corre­
late with amount of cortical damage. But again this could be due to 
the small range of lesion sizes in this study. One would certainly 
expect that large lesions (say 80% of the cortex) would generally pro­
duce a greater deficit in behaviors which were not highly localized. 
However, it may take quite large differences in lesion size to produce 
a mass effect. There could of course be, for some behaviors, a deficit 
level beyond which further increases in neural damage no longer produce 
increasing behavioral loss.
Thus the concept of an analysis of a "behavioral complex" by 
incorporating a Hunter-like model but emphasizing "behavioral unit" 
instead of "stimulus" can explain both equipotential and localized 
neurobehavioral relationships as a function of response complexity.
This model would interpret the alternation error as being more complex 
than the door error as the alternation error involved a type of response 
sequencing that the door error did not. This is somewhat supported by 
the finding that the DEM apparently presented about the same behavioral 
demands as the III maze in terms of door behaviors while the III maze 
alternation error was not equivalent to the simple alternation problem 
presented in the AEM. Also, the alternation error failed to show an 
appreciable recovery while the door error exhibited marked recovery. 
Intuitively it would seem that a "simpler" behavior would show a faster 
and perhaps a greater amount of recovery than a more complex one.
Normal ^s also master the door behaviors more readily than the
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alternation behaviors on the III maze.
General Considerations
The possibility of either a stimulus or response analysis of 
various habits has certainly been recognized by previous researchers, 
including K. S. Lashley. Writing in 1930 (Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 
1960) Lashley discounted both of these possible modes of analysis as 
being inadequate to the task of establishing information of a neuro­
behavioral nature. The reasoning for this was based on two conclusions:
(1) various stimuli can occasion the same response and (2) the same 
motor elements are not necessarily used in the learning and performance 
of motor habits. Thus integrated behavior consisted of more than 
stimulus--response units and shows a "unity of action" even in the 
presence of brain lesions. These conditions, being granted, still do 
not invalidate the concept of an analysis of the behavior side of the 
neurobehavioral problem in terms of defined behavioral units.
The criticism that "the same motor elements are not necessar­
ily used in the learning and performance of motor habits" is irrelevant 
to the observations that a correct sequence of alternations is required 
to reach a door which must be entered to eventually obtain food. A 
left turn is not equivalent to a right turn nor is failure to go through 
a door equivalent to entering that door. The execution of these behav­
iors is demanded by specific task requirements. The behavioral re­
quirement, at least, can be held constant. This is one method of 
controlled behavioral observation and allows for the fractionation of 
a complex behavior into its component parts. This method of observation 
enables us to see that although behavior may have an integrated "unity"
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it can also be viewed as a multitude of units which may not all be 
controlled in the same manner by a given neural mass. While a given 
neural mass may exhibit equipotentiality with respect to some behaviors, 
other behaviors, perhaps less complex, may be more localized.
What is the significance of finding that some behaviors may 
be more localized than others?
Specialization of functions in the cerebral 
cortex is an indisputable fact, but we have yet to 
find an adequate interpretation of it. We have asked, 
where are psychological functions localized in the 
brain? and have gained a meaningless answer. We should 
ask. How do specialized areas produce the details of 
behavior with which they are associated: what are the
functional relationships between the different parts 
and how are they maintained? (Lashley, 1930).
This statement referred to sensory localization but suggests 
that questions concerning psychological localization are meaningless.
In this statement "psychological functions" is equated to "the maze 
habit". This must be the case as Hunter states
It has been necessary in evaluating Lashley's 
theory of the equipotentiality of cerebral action 
to offer a detailed analysis of the sensory control 
of the maze habit because the theory rests almost 
solely upon data gathered on this habit. (Hunter,
1930, p. 465).
Thus conclusions concerning psychological processes are 
derived from rat maze data. This immediately raises the question. Can 
some of the psychological processes of Man be inferred from the maze 
behavior of the rat? Lashley apparently thought so.
Analysis of the maze habit indicates that its 
formation involves processes which are characteristic 
of intelligent behavior. Hence the results for the 
rat are generalized for cerebral function in intelli­
gence. Data on dementia in man are suggestive of 
conditions similar to those found after cerebral 
injury in the rat. (Lashley, 1929, p. 176).
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Both man and rat can be seen as organisms expressing varying 
degrees of behavioral organization.
The question, 'What Is the mental state of an 
animal?' means then: What is the level of organiza­
tion of Its activities? The question can have no 
other meaning because no other conception of mind can 
be derived from experience.
The evolution of mind is the evolution of nervous 
mechanisms, but only the simpler of these can as yet 
be analyzed directly. (Lashley, 1949).
Thus the study of rat maze behavior is a legitimate approach 
to the study of mind. This is the argument of the comparative psycholo­
gist and is either accepted or rejected basically as it stands. Assum­
ing that neurobehavioral relationships, observed in rat maze behaviors, 
are accepted as valid observations concerning the relationship between 
the brain, the mind and behavior, what now? The theory of equipoten­
tiality has supported the concept of mind as a unitary state of the 
organism with assertations of a similar nervous system action.
In short, current brain theory encourages us 
to try to correlate our subjective psychic experi­
ence with the activity of relatively homogeneous 
nerve-cell units conducting essentially homogeneous 
impulses through roughly homogeneous cerebral 
tissue. (Sperry, 1964, p. 406).
Sperry suggests that to search for psychical events in neural 
terms is a naive form of psychoneural isomorphism because the cerebral 
processes apparently do not duplicate, even remotely, the patterns of 
subjective experience. Sperry reiterates the validity of Sherrington's 
now twenty-odd year old remark that "We have to regard the relation of 
mind to brain as still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis 
for its very beginning."
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Sperry, in the 1964 article, is of the opinion that in order 
to advance our thinking of brain functioning "...our present one-sided 
preoccupation with the sensory avenues to the study of mental processes
will need to be supplemented by increased attention to the motor
patterns."
Utilization of this motor approach immediately 
helps us to view the brain objectively for what it 
is, namely, a mechanism for governing motor activity.
Its primary function is essentially the transforming 
of sensory patterns into patterns of motor coordina­
tion.... In man as in the salamander the primary
business of the brain continues to be the governing,
directly or indirectly, of overt behavior.
...the entire activity of the brain, so far as 
science can determine, yields nothing but motor 
adjustment. The only significant energy outlet and 
the only means of expression are over the motor path­
ways.... In both its phylogenetic and ontogenectic 
histories, mental activity develops out of, and in 
reference to, overt action.... Any separation of 
mental and motor processes in the brain would seem to 
be arbitrary and indefinite. (Sperry, 1964).
Thus to study mind one must study overt behavior or pre-motor 
activity. The obvious complexity of subjective psychical phenomena is 
overwhelming as are the obvious complexities of behavior. However, 
granting Sperry's argument, the only fruitful approach to the study of 
these psychological processes is through an analysis of behavior, 
regardless of the awesome nature of the task. The question now is "Is 
mind (and therefore behavior or vice versa) unitary or can it be frac­
tionated into its component parts?
Attempts to analyze "mind" into its components have not been 
particularly successful. At the same time, to approach mind as solely 
a unitary phenomenon is to deny its obvious complexity. Behavior, on 
the other hand, can be subjected to an ever increasingly more
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microscopic analysis, as the maze habit has shown.
If the brain's primary function is to organize behavior, 
either for present or future activity, then an analysis of the structure 
of behavior is the only way in which a valid understanding of neuro­
behavioral relationships can be reached. Logical derived elements of 
behavior, defined by environmental demands, can then be studied as they 
relate to the activity of a given neural substrate. The relationship 
between various behavioral units may be as important in determining 
neurobehavioral relationships as the structure of the nervous system 
itself. Behavior must be studied in terms of its logically derived 
complexity before the laws of neurobehavioral control can themselves be 
derived.
Conclusions
An analysis of the maze habit into other logically derived 
units of behavior has shown that previously unsuspected neurobehavioral 
relationships may exist such as the localization of some but not other 
behavioral components of a larger behavioral complex. The determinants 
of localization versus non-localization, in terms of behavioral units 
are not clearly understood but might be related to the spatio-temporal 
properties of the behavioral complex under investigation. This possi­
bility has been recognized by other investigators, including K. S. 
Lashley, but was never utilized as an experimental approach to neuro­
behavioral mechanisms.
A technique for a precise behavioral analysis would allow for 
a taxonomy of behaviors in terms of spatio-temporal demands that will
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begin to allow us to decipher the phenomenon of the serial order of 
behavior (Lashley, 1951) . Temporal behaviors, which may incorporate 
spatial requirements relevant to a multitude of other behaviors, may be 
less localized than their more spatial counterparts in a behavioral 
complex. The alternation error in the III maze is obviously involved 
with the temporal execution of either of two behaviors, turning left or
right in a proper sequence, while the door error is possibly concerned
more with the execution of one set of behaviors, entering a break in 
the row wall, every time the proper conditions are spatially available. 
The successful maze habit consists of the "set" of both door and alter­
nation behaviors.
Although the present study found that the rat cortex is not 
equipotential with respect to all components of the III maze habit, the 
basic conclusions of this study, that neurobehavioral relationships can 
only be understood when behavior is viewed in terms of its complexity, 
is in close agreement with conclusions about neurobehavioral relation­
ships which Lashley reached nearly twenty years ago, dealing with "The 
Problem of Serial Order in Behavior". (Lashley, 1951).
In that 1951 article Lashley expressed the opinion that many
forms of behavior, from speech to maze mastery, could be viewed as a 
"complex" or "set" of other behaviors and that this behavioral complex 
was the interaction of temporal and spatial systems. This set of behav­
iors was not viewed as being controlled by either central associative 
chains or peripheral sensory-motor reactions but instead was controlled 
by "...some central nervous mechanism which fires with predetermined 
intensity and duration or activates different muscles in predetermined
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order."
The central nervous mechanism which integrates temporal and 
spatial components of a behavioral set was thought to reside in the 
networks of cells of short axons. Moreover, "...the nets active in 
rhythmic and spatial organization are apparently almost coextensive with 
the nervous system." This is basically a re-statement of the laws of 
equipotentiality and mass action which were based upon the view that 
the maze habit is unitary.
The available evidence seems to justify the 
.conclusion that the most important features of the 
maze habit are a generalization of direction from 
the specific turns of the maze and the development 
of some central organization by which the sense of 
general direction can be maintained in spite of 
great variations of posture and specific directions 
in running. (Lashley, 1929, p. 138).
This conclusion is consistent with the data concerning the 
effects of brain lesions upon alternation errors but does not agree 
with the findings concerning brain damage and door errors. The nerve 
nets active in these two behaviors do not appear to be simply coexten­
sive with the nervous system as the door error demonstrates localization 
of function. Since the behaviors may differ in terms of spatio-temporal 
requirements it is quite possible that spatio-temporal systems may not 
be equally integrated by all neural masses. An analysis of behaviors 
in terms of their temporal order and spatial restrictions might result 
in new ideas of neurobehavioral relationships.
The maze habit is probably as valid a picture of behavioral 
integration as is available and should be a fruitful area of research 
concerning both the temporal and spatial characteristcs of behavior.
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Not only speech, but all skilled acts seem to 
involve the same problems of serial ordering, even down 
to the temporal coordination of muscular contractions 
in such a movement as reaching and grasping. Analysis 
of the nervous mechanisms underlying order in the more 
primitive acts may contribute ultimately to the solution 
even of the physiology of logic. (Lashley, 1951, p.
489).
Efforts toward a more complete understanding of the neuro- 
physiological aspect of the behavioral syntax of the III maze habit 
could be a logical step toward an understanding of the physiology of 
the organization of behavior.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
Much of the history of the inquiry into the nature of brain- 
behavior relationships has dealt with the study of the localization of 
functions and asks "Is the control of any behavior(s) the principle 
responsibility of a given neural locus?" Each side of the question of 
localization of function has received the support of scientific opinion 
at some time in history and the issue is presently not resolved. The 
issues, opinions and answers regarding this question have been strongly 
influenced by the existing views of neuroanatomy and behavior. While 
neuroanatomical specificity is granted for many sensory and motor func­
tions, current neurobehavioral theories accept the proposition that no 
part of the rat neocortex is more essential to the acquisition of a com­
plex maze habit than is any other part. Rat cortical neurobehavioral 
relationships are assumed to be governed by the law of "mass action". 
That is, the assumed determinant of a behavioral deficit following 
cortical damage is amount of damage, not site of damage.
This position is based in part on the view that the maze habit 
(Lashley's III maze) is a unitary class of behaviors although the effic­
ient maze habit can be expressed in terms of at least two components: 
one involves entering a door into a new compartment at every opportunity
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and the other involves alternating in a prescribed temporal sequence 
once a compartment is entered. The maze habit can thus be operationally 
defined as consisting of at least two logically distinct units of behav­
ior. The evaluation of performance in terms of door and alternation 
errors represents a quantitative and a qualitative improvement in maze 
behavior measurement over the traditional cul-de-sac error. The alter­
nation behaviors require the learning of a temporal response which is 
not required in the execution of door behaviors. To consider the III 
maze habit unitary is to deny the moment to moment changes in response 
requirements during a successful maze performance.
Earlier studies of the effects of cortical lesions upon maze 
mastery have suffered from the use of either a non-systematic selection 
of destruction sites or the use of only two destroyed zones. The 
systematic examination of at least three cortical zones increases the 
possibility of isolating specific corticobehavioral mechanisms. The 
selective destruction of various subcortical structures was necessary 
to determine whether or not elevations in errors following brain damage 
was primarily a cortical effect. The present investigations examined 
the effects of the bilateral destruction of three cortical zones (AC,
MG and PC) and two subcortical sites (SEP and DLH) upon the acquisition 
of the two logically derived and operationally distinct components of 
the III maze habit— door and alternation behaviors.
The finding that the MC group made significantly more door 
errors than either of the other two cortical groups suggests that the 
rat neocortex is not equipotential with respect to maze mastery. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by the finding that there were no
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significant differences between the groups in terms of amount of cortex 
destroyed. Thus the principle of "mass action" cannot explain the 
differences in performance between the lesion groups.
The finding that all three cortically lesioned groups per­
formed nearly identically with respect to the alternation error would 
suggest that the rat neocortex is equipotential with respect to maze 
mastery. The finding that there were no significant differences between 
the groups in terms of amount of cortex destroyed would simply strengthen 
this conclusion as the law of mass action would also appear to be sat­
isfied.
Thus one finding of this study was that while a given neural 
mass may be equipotential with respect to some behaviors that same 
neural mass may not be equipotential with respect to another set of 
behaviors. The apparent inconsistency of this statement is underscored 
by the fact that it is based upon observations of the same individuals 
following a single nervous system lesion.
Any inconsistency in these findings cannot be due to simple 
inaccuracies of lesion measurement as the two behaviors being measured 
were in the same individuals at approximately the same time, size of 
lesion was controlled. Therefore if the increase in door errors in 
the MC group was due to a greater amount of mass being removed (but 
inaccurately measured) why was there not a corresponding increase in 
alternation errors in that group?
These findings would suggest the possibility of a site by 
behavior interaction as far as a deficit in learning the III maze habit 
is concerned. That is, the effect of a lesion is dependent upon the
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cortical region destroyed and the behavior under study. Furthermore, 
since there was no significant correlation between alterations in these 
behaviors and amount of brain damage, the concept of mass action is 
also challenged. Finally, the percentage of cortex removed also failed 
to relate to other behaviors such as general activity.
These findings indicate that some caution should be exercised 
when proposing "equipotentiality" tempered with "mass action" as deter­
minants of neurobehavioral relationships. As important as these con­
cepts are, they must be considered in terms of particular behaviors.
That is, behavioral definition is as important as neuroanatomical speci­
fication when attempting to state neurobehavioral relationships.
Both errors were also significantly elevated in the subcorti- 
cally damaged ^s indicating that these behaviors are not under exclusive 
cortical control.
A model of the III maze habit which includes door and alter­
nation type behaviors acknowledges the complexity of the successful 
maze habit which requires the ability to initiate and inhibit locomotor 
activity, the ability to recognize and enter openings or breaks in a 
wall surface and the ability to learn a temporal order of turns which 
varies from choice point to choice point.
In an effort to more fully understand the significance of the 
door and alternation errors, tasks were included in one experiment 
which were designed to test specific behavioral dimensions which relate 
to door and alternation behavior. One task, the door error maze, DEM, 
simply required the ^ to detect and enter a break (door) in a runway 
wall surface. This is one description of successful door behavior in
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the III maze.
Another task, the alternation error maze (AEM), was a T-maze 
and required the ^ to learn a simple alternation response that never 
changed. If III maze alternation errors were due to the Inability to 
master a simple alternation problem then the results from this Instru­
ment should correspond to the alternation error behavior seen In the 
III maze.
Another task measured the ability to acquire and extinguish 
a simple straight runway locomotor response. A general measure of 
spontaneous activity was also taken to further examine the role of this 
behavioral substrate In the III maze behaviors.
The DEM analysis Indicated that It too could detect brain 
damage In a manner highly similar to the III maze. With few exceptions 
the results from the two tasks appear to be almost Identical In terms 
of group effects. The tasks themselves would appear to have basic 
similarities.
The finding that the AEM failed to distinguish between groups 
would Indicate that the AEM may not adequately reflect the "alternation 
error" component of the III maze. The alternation component of the III 
maze Is probably determined by the sequencing of alternatives while the 
AEM used In this study required only the learning of a simple alter­
nation response that never varied.
The failure to find any significant differences between 
groups In terms of either the straight alley maze (SAM) acquisition or 
extinction behaviors would suggest that the brain damage related behav­
iors seen In this study were not due to unusual motivational or motoric
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factors. The extinction behaviors of all groups would also argue 
against a simple "response perseveration" hypothesis to explain the 
results of certain lesions. Thus there appear to be no basic failures 
of either "maze excitation" or "maze inhibition" in any of the experi­
mental groups.
The findings that the cortical group which made the most door 
errors was also the most active and that there was a significant corre­
lation between door errors and activity across groups suggest that 
activity is an important dimension of the door error behavior. This 
does not seem to be the case for the alternation error as the correla­
tion between these behaviors and activity were nonsignificant. The 
activity phase of Experiment II found that large changes in activity 
were produced by both cortical and subcortical lesions. The groups 
that were the most active were also the ones which made more door errors.
The two primary behaviors under study, door and alternation 
errors in the III maze, while having some apparent face validity in 
terms of their distinctions, are not completely understood in terms of 
their respective behavioral significance. Although the two behaviors 
were significantly correlated with each other they were affected dif­
ferently by the various lesions. Also the dynamics of the two behav­
iors are distinguishable in the maze. The door error shows a goal- 
gradient across rows with the row furtherest from the goal (row one) 
showing the most errors and the row nearest the goal (row six) being 
the least difficult. This was not the case for the alternation error 
as row six was one of the most difficult rows for this behavior. The 
two behaviors also differed with respect to their level of recovery
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following brain damage. The door error, although being strongly exag­
gerated by the cortical lesions, had recovered to a near normal level 
by trial twelve but the alternation error showed only slight recovery by 
trial twenty. Previous studies have also found the rate of acquisition 
of the two behaviors to differ in normal ^ with the door error being 
more quickly eliminated than the alternation error over trials.
Perhaps a neurobehavioral model which incorporates both the 
remarkable equipotentiality of the alternation error and the elusive 
localization of the door error, for the same neural mass, is not pre­
sently available. This may not be due as much to failings of neuro­
anatomical sophistication as to the failure to view behavior in terms 
of its obvious complexity.
While environmental demands and responses vary from moment to 
moment the integrated behavior of the organism retains a unity of ex­
pression that sometimes masks the complexity of the organization of the 
various moment to moment behaviors. There are certainly levels of 
behavioral organization which include other behaviors in their expres­
sion. There may even exist two types of behavioral processes— one 
involving responses to simple repetitions of events and the other 
occurring when the temporal requirements of response execution are more 
complex. The expression of these various behaviors can be viewed as a 
"behavioral complex" where the total integrated behavior may be composed 
of other distinguishable behavioral states. Thus the successful maze 
habit is complex when it includes successful door and alternation 
behaviors in its expression. The concept of a "behavioral complex" 
allows for a continual analysis of the components of that complex
115
whereas the concept of "behavior" or "reflex" or "habit" implies a 
finiteness that discourages further analysis. This could greatly influ­
ence neurobehavioral theory (and investigations).
Granted the concept of a "behavioral complex", as opposed to 
"habit", the argument can be made that the more complex the behavior in 
question (i.e., maze mastery as opposed to a righting response), the 
higher the probability that several brain systems contribute to that 
behavior. Damage to any one of the several brain systems involved in 
a highly complex behavior would result in a deficit in that behavior. 
Therefore the greater the probability that "equipotentiality" holds for 
that behavior. As the total behavioral picture can be reduced to its 
component parts then the probability of localized neural control for 
any component is increased.
Thus the concept of an analysis of a "behavioral complex" by 
incorporating a Hunter-like model but emphasing "behavioral unit" 
instead of stimulus can explain both equipotential and localized neuro­
behavioral relationships as a function of response complexity. The 
problem thus becomes one of evaluating the complexity of a given set of 
behaviors. One dimension of response complexity is spatio-temporal in 
nature. Responses which require the learning of a temporal sequence 
involve a level of organization not seen in responses executed to simple 
repetitions of events.
The alternation behaviors, which require a temporal sequencing, 
should therefore represent a more complex behavioral expression than the 
door behaviors which afford a more limited response requirement. There 
are other lines of evidence to suggest that the alternation behavior is
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more complex than the door behavior: (1) the door behaviors are
easier to master than are the alternation behaviors In normal Ss and
(2) the door behaviors show recovery following brain damage while the 
alternation errors do not.
Intuitively It would appear that a less complex habit would 
be easier to master Initially and re-learn following brain damage.
Thus the equipotentiality of the door behavior could be due to Its 
temporal complexity. Temporal behaviors, which may Incorporate spatial 
requirements relevant to a multitude of other behaviors, may be less 
localized than their more spatial counterparts In a behavioral complex.
If the brain's primary function Is to control or organize 
behavior, either In the present or for some future action, then an 
analysis of the organization of behavior Is the only way In which a 
valid understanding of neurobehavioral relationships can be reached.
An analysis of behaviors In terms of their temporal order and spatial 
restrictions might result In new Ideas of neurobehavioral relationship. 
Logical derived elements of behavior, defined by environmental demands, 
can then be studied as they relate to the activity of a given neural 
substrate. The relationship between various behavioral units may be as 
Important In determining neurobehavioral relationships as the structure 
of the nervous system Itself. Behavior must be studied In terms of Its 
logically derived complexity before the laws of neurobehavioral control 
can themselves be deduced.
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APPENDIX A
TOTAL DOOR (De) AND ALTERNATION (Ae) ERRORS AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CORTICAL DESTRUCTION (%),
BY SUBJECT, FOR THE COMBINED CORTICAL 
GROUPS OF EXPERIMENT I AND II
Anterior Middle Posterior
1 De Ae % De Ae % De Ae
28.3 20 40 21.8 60 54 25.3 45 52
32.6 66 52 19.9 81 70 19.1 19 35
18.6 36 54 18.2 70 75 24.2 136 73
31.1 74 62 25.7 64 70 22.1 83 68
33.9 30 47 25.5 187 47 11.4 20 26
10.7 24 42 28.1 97 69 22.1 62 49
12.2 58 53 29.4 41 45 18.2 49 56
11.5 42 56 23.2 57 48 28.5 36 37
20.2 90 41 10.3 31 37 17.8 21 43
24.9 63 67 22.9 32 44 15.6 53 53
19.7 135 63 31.5 42 44
25.3 132 48 28.7 33 49
22.4 50.3 51.,4 22.5 82.3 55.8 22.0 49.9 48.8
9.0 23.3 9.,0 5.1 47.6 12.8 5.9 32.9 13.3
